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THE COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Kevin Jon Heller*
Empirical research indicates that jurors routinely undervalue circumstan-
tial evidence (DNA, fingerprints, and the like) and overvalue direct
evidence (eyewitness identifications and confessions) when making verdict
choices, even though false-conviction statistics indicate that the former is
normally more probative and more reliable than the latter The traditional
explanation of this paradox, based on the probability-threshold model of
jury decision-making, is that jurors simply do not understand circumstan-
tial evidence and thus routinely underestimate its effect on the objective
probability of the defendant's guilt. That may be true in some situations,
but it fails to account for what is known in cognitive psychology as the
Wells Effect: the puzzling fact that jurors are likely to acquit in a circum-
stantial case even when they know the objective probability of the
defendant's guilt is sufficient to convict. This Article attempts to explain
why jurors find circumstantial evidence so psychologically troubling. It be-
gins by using a variety of psychological research into judgment and
decision-making-Kahneman & Tversky's simulation heuristic in particu-
lar-to argue that jurors decide whether to acquit in a criminal case not
through mechanical probability calculations, but on the basis of their abil-
ity to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is factually innocent. The
Article then examines the basic epistemological differences between direct
and circumstantial evidence and shows how those differences normally
make it easier for jurors to imagine a factually exculpatory scenario in a
circumstantial case. Finally, the Article concludes by discussing how an
ease-of-simulation model of jury decision-making improves our under-
standing of why false verdicts occur
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INTRODUCTION
"He[, the Judge,] says to them: Perhaps ye saw him running after his fel-
low into a ruin, ye pursued him, and found him sword in hand with blood
dripping from it, whilst the murdered man was writhing [in agony]: If this
is what ye saw, ye saw nothing."1
Classical Jewish law was profoundly skeptical of circumstantial evi-
dence. Such evidence was per se inadmissible in a criminal case; to convict,
direct evidence of the defendant's guilt-specifically, the testimony of two
witnesses who saw the defendant commit the crime-was required.2 The
rationale for the rule, according to Talmudic scholars, was the need to pro-
tect the innocent from unjust conviction: because of its probabilistic nature,
not even the strongest circumstantial evidence could completely prove the
defendant's guilt.3 Maimonides explained as follows:
Do not let this puzzle you, or think the law unjust. For among events which
are within the bounds of possibility, some are very probable and others
highly improbable, and still others are in between the two .... If we do
not give judgment even on the basis of a very strong presumption, the
worst that can happen is that the sinner will be acquitted; but if we punish
on the strength of presumptions and suppositions, it may be that one day
we shall put to death an innocent person; and it is better and more satisfac-
tory to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent man
4
to death ....
Modem Anglo-American law, of course, does not view circumstantial
evidence as inferior to direct evidence. Wigmore says that "it is out of the
question to make a general assertion ascribing greater weight to one class or
to the other."5 The Supreme Court agreed in Holland v. United States, hold-
ing that direct and circumstantial evidence are "intrinsically no different.
' 6
The Court acknowledged that circumstantial evidence can lead to an incor-
rect result, but noted that in "both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the
chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the possibility of
inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury must use its experience
with people and events in weighing the probabilities."7
1. 1 Sanhedrin, THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD-SANHEDRIN 235 (I. Epstein ed., Jacob
Shachter trans., Soncino Press 1935).
2. See Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, "Perhaps What Ye Say is Based Only
on Conjecture "-Circumstantial Evidence, Then and Now, 31 Hous. L. REv. 1371, 1378 (1995).
3. In fact, the root of the Hebrew word for circumstantial evidence, omed, means "to esti-
mate" or "guess." Id. at 1377.
4. 2 THE COMMANDMENTS 270 (Charles B. Chavel trans., Soncino Press 1967).
5. 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 26, at 401 (3d ed. 1940).
6. 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954).
7. Id.
November 20061
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Some scholars, in fact, have argued that circumstantial evidence is supe-
rior to direct evidence. Edmund Burke was of that opinion,' as was William
Paley, who famously explained that a "concurrence of well-authenticated
circumstances composes a stronger ground of assurance, than positive tes-
timony, unconfirmed by circumstances, usually affords. Circumstances
cannot lie."9
Error rates and false-conviction statistics support Burke and Paley. Both
indicate that direct evidence-false confessions and mistaken or perjured
eyewitness identifications-is much less reliable than circumstantial evi-
dence. For example, studies have shown that eyewitness identifications are
mistaken more than 58% of the time,' ° whereas less than 1% of DNA
matches turn out to be erroneous." Similarly, although 68% of the false
convictions that Bedau and Radelet identified in their famous study resulted
from problems with direct evidence, only 9% resulted from problems with
circumstantial evidence.' 2 So if we take seriously Maimonides' assertion that
it is better "to acquit a thousand guilty persons than to put a single innocent
man to death," direct evidence would seem to be a far better candidate for
categorical exclusion than circumstantial evidence. Circumstances may
sometimes lie, but witnesses lie far more often.
Empirical research into jury decision-making, however, indicates that ju-
rors agree with Maimonides. That research, discussed in detail below, has
consistently found that jurors dramatically undervalue circumstantial evi-
dence and just as dramatically overvalue direct evidence. One study of
direct evidence, for example, found that jurors overestimated the accuracy
of eyewitness identifications by more than 500%." Conversely, the "most
surprising finding" of a study of circumstantial forensic evidence "was how
easily people can be persuaded to give no weight" to such evidence.
4
There is, in short, an unsettling paradox concerning the use of circum-
stantial evidence in criminal trials: although it is far less likely to lead to a
false conviction than direct evidence, jurors are so reluctant to use it to con-
vict that a circumstantial case often results in the opposite problem, a false
8. See 8 EDMUND BURKE, THE WORKS OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE EDMUND BURKE 96
(1852).
9. WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 551 (London,
R. Faulder 1785).
10. BRIAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWIT-
NESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 13 (1995).
11. See Jonathan J. Koehler, When Do Courts Think Base Rate Statistics Are Relevant?, 42
JURIMETRICS 373, 394 (2002).
12. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 56-58 (1987).
13. John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to Estimate
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 24 (1983).
14. William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 182 (1987).
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acquittal."5 Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that the Talmudic
prohibition on circumstantial evidence lives on in the minds of modem-day
jurors via the shibboleth-regularly disseminated by television and the mov-
ies-that "it's all circumstantial."'
6
The question is-why?
The traditional explanation is that jurors simply do not understand the
importance of circumstantial evidence-DNA matches, fingerprint compari-
sons, and the like-and thus underestimate its effect on the objective
probability of the defendant's guilt. 7 In one study of blood evidence, for
example, sixty-six percent of mock jurors misunderstood the evidence in a
way that led them to significantly underestimate its probative value.
That explanation, however, is not the whole story. On the contrary, a se-
ries of sophisticated mock-jury studies has found that jurors are likely to
acquit in a circumstantial case even when they know the objective probabil-
ity of the defendant's guilt is sufficient to convict. 9 That phenomenon,
known as the Wells Effect, ° is irreconcilable with the traditional explana-
tion, because it indicates that jurors' undervaluation of circumstantial
• • 21
evidence is psychological, not cognitive.
To understand jurors' reluctance to convict in circumstantial cases, then,
we need to explain why jurors find circumstantial evidence so psychologically
troubling. Such an explanation might allow us to understand not only their
undervaluation of circumstantial evidence, but their overvaluation of direct
evidence as well.
The object of this Article is thus twofold: (1) to explain why jurors are
likely to acquit in a circumstantial case even when they know that the evi-
dence is objectively sufficient to convict; and (2) to explain why jurors are
likely to convict in a direct case even when there is reason to believe that the
evidence may be unreliable. The Article's central thesis is that both phe-
nomena result from the same cognitive mechanism-the fact that jurors
decide whether to acquit not through mechanical probability calculations,
but on the basis of their ability to imagine a scenario in which the defendant
15. See H. Richard Uviller, Acquitting the Guilty: Two Case Studies on Jury Misgivings and
the Misunderstood Standard of Proof, 2 CRiM. L.F. 1,4 (1990). For obvious reasons, it is impossible
to know how often false acquittals occur in circumstantial cases. Their existence, however, is sup-
ported both by anecdote, cf id. at 9, and by the empirical research that indicates jurors
fundamentally underestimate the probative value of circumstantial evidence.
16. See Paul Bergman, A Bunch of Circumstantial Evidence, 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 985, 986
(1996).
17. See, e.g., Thompson & Schumann, supra note 14, at 181 ("The most likely explanation is
that subjects simply gave less weight to the [circumstantial] evidence than it deserves.").
18. Id. at 179.
19. See Gary L. Wells, Naked Statistical Evidence of Liability: Is Subjective Probability
Enough?, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 739, 744 (1992).
20. See Keith E. Niedermeier et al., Jurors' Use of Naked Statistical Evidence: Exploring
Bases and Implications of the Wells Effect, 76 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 533, 534 (1999).
21. Cf David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes'Theorem in the Trial Process: Instruct-
ing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 16 (1988).
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is factually innocent. I will argue that, for a variety of reasons, jurors nor-
mally find it easier to imagine such a factually exculpatory scenario in a
circumstantial case than in a direct case.
The Article itself is divided into seven Parts. Part I presents the experi-
mental and statistical data behind the paradox of circumstantial evidence.
Part II discusses the traditional explanation of the paradox and explains why
it cannot be reconciled with the existence of the Wells Effect. Part III intro-
duces a later study of the Wells Effect that indicates jurors' willingness to
acquit in a criminal case is determined by their ability to imagine a scenario
in which the defendant is factually innocent. Part IV argues that jury deci-
sion-making is based on the "simulation heuristic"-a cognitive mechanism
individuals often employ to determine the probability of uncertain events-
and sketches what a general model of jury decision-making based on the
simulation heuristic would look like, what I call the ease-of-simulation
model. Part V-the theoretical core of the Article-applies the ease-of-
simulation model, explaining why jurors normally find it easier to imagine a
factually exculpatory scenario in a circumstantial case than in a direct case.
Part VI shows how the insights of Part V unravel the paradox of circumstan-
tial evidence-and help deepen our understanding of why false convictions
and acquittals occur with such distressing regularity. Finally, Part VII specu-
lates about how it might be possible to counteract the Wells Effect and the
paradox of circumstantial evidence it creates.
Before proceeding, two caveats. First, in order to explain why jurors find
circumstantial evidence so troubling, I will focus on ideal-typical 22 cases: on
the direct side, those in which the prosecution relies exclusively on a con-
fession or an eyewitness identification to prove the defendant's guilt; on the
circumstantial side, those in which the prosecution proves the defendant's
guilt exclusively through forensic evidence. Neither kind of case is uncom-
mon, although most prosecutions involve a combination of direct and
circumstantial evidence. How the principles articulated in this Article func-
tion in such "mixed" cases23 is discussed separately in Section VI.
Second, except for its explanation of false verdicts, this Article is long
on theory and short on practical application. Although cognitive psycholo-
gists and legal scholars have recognized that jurors overvalue direct
evidence and undervalue circumstantial evidence, they have never attempted
to construct a unified theory capable of explaining both phenomena. It
seems appropriate, therefore, to devote the bulk of this Article to elaborating
and defending the ease-of-simulation model.
22. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY
19-22 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
23. Such cases are all technically circumstantial, of course, because proof of the defendant's
guilt requires inference.
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I. THE PROBLEM DESCRIBED
What I call "the paradox of circumstantial evidence" involves two sepa-
rate empirical claims: that jurors undervalue circumstantial evidence relative
to direct evidence; and that circumstantial evidence is nevertheless more
reliable than direct evidence. Section A of this Part defends the first claim;
Section B defends the second.
A. Jurors' Misevaluation of Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
For every item of evidence, direct or circumstantial, we must distinguish
between two different probabilities: (1) the probability that the defendant is
guilty if the evidence is true; and (2) the probability that the evidence is
24true.
The first probability measures the probative value of an item of evi-
dence. If conditions allowed the eyewitness to accurately identify the
defendant as the murderer, how probable does that make the defendant's
guilt? If the DNA match did not result from lab error, to what extent does
the match make the defendant's guilt more likely? The second probability
measures the reliability of an item of evidence-whether viewing conditions
did, in fact, allow the eyewitness to see the defendant commit the murder, or
whether the DNA match did, in fact, result from lab error.
Although these probabilities are analytically distinct,25 they are interre-
lated. The overall probative value of an item of evidence depends, at least in
part, on its reliability: if the evidence is less than completely reliable, its
probative value is reduced. Consider, for example, a murder case in which
an eyewitness positively identifies the defendant as the killer. If we believe
that the identification is completely reliable and identity is the only disputed
issue in the case, the probative value of the identification is 1.016 -it conclu-
sively establishes the defendant's guilt. If we suspect that the eyewitness
was too far away to make a perfect identification, however, we have to dis-
count the probative value of the identification to take that concern into
account. As a result, its probative value will necessarily be less than 1.0-
although the identification may still have some probative value, we can no
longer assume that it conclusively establishes the defendant's guilt. Indeed,
the more unreliable we find the identification, the lower its probative value
will be.:
There are, then, two different ways in which jurors can overvalue or un-
dervalue evidence. First, jurors can overestimate or underestimate the
probative value of a reliable piece of evidence by assuming that it increases
24. See Peter W. Murphy, Some Reflections on Evidence and Proof, 40 S. TEx. L. REV. 327,
344 (1999); cf. Dale Griffin & Amos Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of
Confidence, in THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 231 (2002).
25. See Griffin & Tversky, supra note 24, at 231.
26. Following Murphy, I use a 0.0-1.0 scale instead of the more cumbersome 0-100% scale.
27. See Murphy, supra note 24, at 344.
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the objective probability of the defendant's guilt more or less than it actually
does. Second, jurors can overestimate or underestimate the reliability of
evidence, thereby assigning it either too much or too little probative value.
With those two possibilities in mind, we can examine the specific ways in
which jurors overvalue direct evidence and undervalue circumstantial evi-
dence.
1. Direct Evidence
Direct evidence is evidence that "proves a fact without an inference or
presumption and which in itself, if true, establishes that fact."28 The category
of direct evidence thus includes eyewitness identifications and confessions,
the ideal examples of which prove the defendant's guilt without the need for
inference.2 9
a. Eyewitness Identifications
Empirical studies agree that jurors rarely question the reliability of eye-
witness identifications, thus failing to discount their probative value
adequately in situations where evidence is unreliable.
First, jurors simply believe that eyewitness identifications are far more
reliable than they actually are.30 In the study mentioned earlier, for example,
mock j urors predicted an accuracy rate of 7 1%, although the actual accuracy
rate was only 13%." Another study found that jurors believed nearly four
out of five mistaken identifications." Such credulity has a direct effect on
verdicts: although one meta-analysis concluded that less than 42% of eye-
witness identifications are accurate,33 a study of UK crime statistics found
that jurors convict in 74% of eyewitness cases.34 Indeed, Elizabeth Loftus
28. BARBARA E. BERGMAN & NANCY HOLLANDER, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1:8
(1997) (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-102(4) (1995)).
29. To be sure, jurors must rely on inference to determine whether an eyewitness identifica-
tion or confession is reliable. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and
Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1330 n.2 (1971) (noting that "all legal proof [is]
ultimately 'probabilistic,' in the epistemological sense that no conclusion can ever be drawn from
empirical data without some step of inductive inference--even if only an inference that things are
usually what they are perceived to be"). My point, as this Section demonstrates, is that jurors rarely
question the reliability of direct evidence and thus normally accept an eyewitness identification or
confession at face value--as if there is no inference required to infer guilt from it.
30. Steven Penrod & Brian Cutler, Witness Confidence and Witness Accuracy, 1 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 817, 819 (1995).
31. Brigham & Bothwell, supra note 13, at 24.
32. Gary L. Wells et al., Accuracy, Confidence, and Juror Perceptions in Eyewitness Identifi-
cation, 64 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 440, 447 (1979); see also R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Can People Detect
Eyewitness Identification Accuracy Within and Across Situations?, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 79, 84
(1981) (finding that jurors were able to identify mistaken eyewitness identifications made in low-,
moderate-, and high-accuracy situations 39%, 34%, and 25% of the time, respectively).
33. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 10, at 12-13.
34. See HON. LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, REPORT ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMI-
NAL CASES (1976).
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was able to raise the conviction rate in a mock circumstantial case from 18%
to 72% simply by adding an eyewitness.35
Second, jurors are insensitive to-and in fact often completely ignore-
factors that reduce the accuracy, and thus the reliability, of eyewitness iden-
tifications, such as the presence of a disguise, weapon-focus, the level of
violence in the crime, retention interval, instruction bias, and foil bias.36
Third, the one factor that jurors do rely on to determine the accuracy of
an eyewitness identification-the witness's confidence that she made a cor-
rect identification3-is at best "a poor predictor of identification accuracy
' '3s
and may have no relationship with reliability at all.39
Fourth, trying to encourage jurors to be skeptical of eyewitness identifi-
cations by giving them a Telfaire instruction"° not only fails to accomplish
its task, but can actually backfire and make jurors more likely to convict.4'
Fifth, jurors often ignore evidence that directly contradicts an eyewitness
identification. In the Loftus study mentioned earlier, one set of jurors heard
evidence that the eyewitness could not have identified the defendant because
he had not been wearing his glasses. Even though that evidence was uncon-
tested, 68% of the mock jurors still voted to convict. 42
Sixth, and finally, although cross-examination is the medium through
which jurors ostensibly learn of problems with evidence, "eyewitness testi-
mony is curiously resistant to this technique. 43 One study, in fact, found that
"[e]ven experienced lawyers, free to question the witness as they chose,
were unable to lead mock jurors to believe accurate eyewitnesses more than
inaccurate eyewitnesses." Moreover, in some situations cross-examination
can actually cause jurors to find dishonest witnesses more honest-a robust
phenomenon known as "the probing effect.'" 5
35. Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOL. To-
DAY, Dec. 1974, at 116, 118.
36. Brian L. Cutler et al., Research Note, Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness Identification Evi-
dence, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 190 (1990).
37. Id. at 189 ("Witness confidence [is] the only statistically significant ... effect of appre-
ciable magnitude [on jurors' assessment of identification accuracy].").
38. Jennifer L. Devenport & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 3 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 338, 349 (1997).
39. See Wells et al., supra note 32, at 446.
40. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (instructing wit-
nesses to be skeptical of eyewitness identifications).
41. See Penrod & Cutler, supra note 30, at 833.
42. Loftus, supra note 35, at 118.
43. George Rahaim & Stanley Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common Sense: Juror
and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. 1, 7 (1982).
44. R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Witnesses, 13 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 333, 338 (1989).
45. Timothy R. Levine & Steven A. McComack, Behavioral Adaptation, Confidence, and
Heuristic-Based Explanations of the Probing Effect, 27 Hum. COMM. RES. 471, 472 (2001). Levine
and McComack suggest that watching a potential liar being probed causes receivers to become
falsely confident that they can distinguish truth from falsity, thereby creating a "truth bias" that leads
November 2006]
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b. Confessions
Jurors also normally fail to question the reliability of confessions. As
Saul Kassin puts it, "confession evidence is so inherently prejudicial that
people do not fully discount the information even when it is logically and
legally appropriate to do so.
46
First, jurors exhibit a "positive coercion bias" in their consideration of
confession evidence. 7 One of the earliest studies found that a confession
elicited by promises of leniency increased mock jurors' probability-of-
commission estimates and the proportion of guilty verdicts, even though the
jurors indicated that they believed the confession was involuntary and that it
did not play a significant role in their deliberations. 4 Later research, more-
over, found that the positive coercion bias persisted even when mock jurorsS41
were specifically told by a judge to discount the involuntary confession.
Second, a recent study found that jurors also exhibit a negative coercion
bias.5 ° When presented with a confession extracted after a police officer
waved a gun in the defendant's face, jurors ostensibly responded in the le-
gally appropriate manner: they concluded that the statement was involuntary
and disregarded it. Nevertheless, the presence of the confession still signifi-S • 51
cantly increased the number of convictions.
Third, and perhaps most troubling of all, confessions are so powerful in
the eyes of jurors that they "tend to overwhelm other information, including
evidence of innocence. '2 Indeed, at least one study has found that 73% of
juries will convict even when a confession has been repudiated by the de-
53fendant and contradicts the physical evidence in the case.
2. Circumstantial Evidence
"Circumstantial evidence is evidence from which the fact-finder can in-
fer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist.'54 Circumstantial
them to assume--because they are focusing on the wrong cues-that the liar is telling the truth. Id.
at 477.
46. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221, 229
(1997).
47. Id. "Positive" because the confession was elicited through promises of leniency instead
of threats of punishment. Id.
48. Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, Prior Confessions and Mock Juror Verdicts,
10 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 133, 143 (1980).
49. Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test
of the "Harmless Error" Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997).
50. See Kassin & Wrightsman, supra note 48, at 229.
51. Id.
52. Saul M. Kassin et al., "I'd Know a False Confession If I Saw One": A Comparative
Study of College Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 213 (2005).
53. BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 92 (2000).
54. BERGMAN & HOLLANDER, supra note 28, at § 1:8 (citation omitted).
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evidence thus includes all forensic evidence, such as blood or fingerprints,
as well as non-forensic evidence that does not by itself prove the defendant's
guilt.
a. Forensic Evidence
The primary problem with jurors' use of circumstantial forensic evi-
dence concerns their assessment of its probative value, not its reliability.
Specifically, jurors consistently underestimate the probative value of such
evidence. As Thompson and Schumann say, "people generally lack a clear
sense of how to draw appropriate conclusions from such evidence and.., as
a result, judgments based on such evidence are highly malleable. 5 6
Thompson and Schumann's study certainly supports that idea. They
asked seventy-three mock jurors to determine how the presence of the de-
fendant's blood at a murder scene increased the probability-initially set at
0.10-that the defendant committed the crime. According to traditional
Bayesian analysis, the blood evidence increased the objective probability of
the defendant's guilt to 0.92. The mean probability estimated by the mock
jurors, however, was only 0.28."
Other studies have reached similar conclusions.58 The most dramatic in-
volved a hypothetical murder case in which five groups of mock jurors were
asked to use blood-typing evidence to assess the probability of the defen-
dant's guilt.59 Not only did jurors dramatically underestimate the probative
value of the evidence relative to the Bayesian norm-the disparity ranging
from 80-100%-the undervaluation was actually greatest when the evi-
dence was the most incriminating. 60
b. Other Circumstantial Evidence
The category of circumstantial evidence also includes all other evidence,
testimonial or non-testimonial, that relies on inference to prove the defen-
dant's guilt: real evidence, like the gun used in the crime or a shirt stained
with the victim's blood; partial eyewitness identifications (as in
55. Indeed, jurors are capable of understanding how laboratory error rates affect the proba-
tive value of scientific evidence, at least when those rates are presented to them in an understandable
form. See Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA Evidence, 34 J. LEGAL
STUD. 395, 436 (2005).
56. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 14, at 181.
57. Id. at 180.
58. See, e.g., Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 21, at 13-14 (concluding, in a blood-typing
study, that subjects either "virtually ignored the statistical evidence" or "underutilized it when com-
pared to a Bayesian model"); Brian C. Smith et al., Jurrs' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 49, 74 (1996) (concluding, in a study involving blood typing, that jurors not only
tended to underuse the forensic evidence, but some "actually reduced their guilt assessment in light
of the probabilistic evidence").
59. Jane Goodman, Jurors' Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361, 368-72 (1992).
60. Id. at 373.
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Maimonides' hypothetical); testimony about motive; and so on. I discuss
how the principles articulated in ideal-typical cases apply to cases involving
these kinds of circumstantial evidence in Part VI.
B. The Greater Reliability of Circumstantial Evidence
Jurors, in short, consistently overvalue direct evidence and undervalue
circumstantial evidence. That's unfortunate, because research into error rates
and false-conviction statistics both indicate that circumstantial evidence is
actually far more reliable.
1. Error Rates
Although it is impossible to determine how often confessions are erro-61
neous, numerous studies have found that error rates for eyewitness
identifications-the more common form of direct evidence-are extremely
high. Penrod and Cutler, for example, conducted a meta-analysis of studies
in which subjects witnessed a criminal act and were then asked to pick the
perpetrator out of a lineup. When the perpetrator was present in the lineup,
subjects failed to identify him accurately more than 58% of the time. 62 Even
more disturbing, when the perpetrator was absent from the lineup, subjects
63identified someone else-an innocent person-nearly 36% of the time.
The studies analyzed by Cutler and Penrod, moreover, involved nearly
ideal identification situations, in which the criminal act did not involve vio-
lence, visibility was perfect, and there was only a brief delay between
exposure and identification. False-positive rates64 are even higher when the
identification situation involves a violent act, imperfect visibility, or a long
delay between exposure and identification. In such situations, which more
closely approximate real-world identifications, eyewitnesses falsely identify
an innocent person as the perpetrator nearly 60% of the time -and nearly
90% of the time when verbal instructions from the police lead them to be-
66lieve that the perpetrator is present in the lineup.
These error rates stand in stark contrast to the error rates of circumstan-
tial forensic evidence. Although some methods of forensic analysis are so
error-prone that they border on junk science-bite-mark comparison, with
61. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Using the Innocent to Scapegoat Miranda: An-
other Reply to Paul Cassell, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 557, 569 (1998) (noting that it is
impossible to determine an error rate for confessions because the error rate for the criminal-justice
system as a whole is unknown); Matthew Iverson, Where the Right to Silence Went Wrong, 86 MAss.
L. REv. 105, 112 (2002).
62. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 10, at 12-13.
63. Id.
64. These represent the percentage of cases in which an innocent person is identified as the
perpetrator of the crime.
65. Ralph Norman Haber & Lynn Haber, Experiencing, Remembering and Reporting Events,
6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 1057, 1080 (2000).
66. Id.
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67its false-positive error rate of 64%, for example -most methods are excep-
tionally accurate. DNA analysis has a false-positive rate of less than 1%,
6
8
and the false-positive rate of conventional serological testing is 5-7%. Bal-
listics has a false-positive rate of 2-3%,70 toolmark analysis7' has a false-
positive rate no higher than 5%,7' and microscopic hair analysis has a false-
positive rate of approximately 4%.73 Even fingerprint analysis, the objectiv-• 74
ity of which has faced increasing scrutiny, has a false-positive rate of less
than 1%.
75
2. False-Conviction Statistics
False-conviction statistics also indicate that circumstantial evidence is
more reliable than direct evidence. The statistics, of course, are not conclu-
sive. To some extent, the greater number of false convictions involving
direct evidence may simply reflect the fact that there are more convictions in
direct cases than in circumstantial cases, either because direct cases are
more common or because-as I argue in this Article-jurors are generally
less likely to convict in circumstantial cases. Nevertheless, given the error-
rate research summarized above, it is reasonable to assume that the abnor-
mally high number of false convictions in direct cases is, in fact, a reflection
of direct evidence's greater unreliability.
a. Eyewitness Identifications
Unreliable eyewitness identifications are by far the most significant
cause of false convictions. In Bedau and Radelet's study, 55% of the 350
false convictions they examined involved perjured or mistaken eyewitness
76identifications. A 1996 study of 28 false convictions found that all of the
67. See C. Michael Bowers, The Scientific Status of Bitemark Comparisons: Proficiency
Testing of Board Certified Odontologists, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCI-
ENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 30-2.1.3(1) (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002).
68. See Koehler, supra note 11, at 394.
69. See Joseph L. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham, Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing
Results, 1978-1991, 11: Resolving Questions of Common Origin, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009, 1015
(1995).
70. See John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rationale of
Forensic Identification, in 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY § 31:45 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 3d ed. 2005).
71. The analysis of marks made by screwdrivers, drill bits, hammers, etc.
72. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 70, § 31:45.
73. See Peterson & Markham, supra note 69, at 1022-23.
74. See, e.g., Tarnara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-Weighing Fingerprint Evidence in
Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 39-44 (2003).
75. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 70, § 31:38; cf Simon A. Cole, More than Zero:
Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 1027
(2005) (suggesting an error rate from 0.2% to 2.5%).
76. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 12, at 60.
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false convictions involved mistaken eyewitness identifications." Of the In-
nocence Project's first 130 exonerations, 78% involved mistaken or perjured
eyewitness identifications. 8 Finally, a 2004 study found that problematic
eyewitness identifications were responsible for 64% of 328 false convic-
79tions-and for 90% of the false convictions in rape cases.
b. Confessions
False convictions also often result from unreliable confessions. In Bedau
and Radelet's study, 14% of the 350 convictions involved coerced or other-wise flse . 80
wise false confessions. Later studies yielded similar percentages. A full
27% of the Innocence Project's first 130 exonerations involved false confes-
sions,"l and false confessions were responsible for 15% of the false
convictions in the 2004 study.8 2
c. Circumstantial Forensic Evidence
Although by any standard false convictions result far less often from cir-
cumstantial evidence than from direct evidence, the number of such
convictions depends on how we define the category of circumstantial errors.
Specifically, it is useful to distinguish between what we might call "pure"
and "hybrid" errors. Pure errors are those that result solely from the am-
biguous or problematic nature of the evidence itself-errors that are not
caused by human misconduct. Such errors include coincidental DNA
matches,"' unintentional laboratory errors,8 and coincidences that make an
innocent person seem guilty." Pure errors might also include those caused
by junk science, assuming that the science in question was, at the time, gen-
86
erally thought to be valid .
Hybrid errors, by contrast, are those that are caused by some kind of in-
tentional human misconduct, including falsified lab results, intentional
77. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 15 (1996).
78. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 53, at 365.
79. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, 95 J.
CrIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542 (2005).
80. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 12, at 57.
81. SCHECK ET AL., supra note 53, at 361.
82. Gross et al., supra note 79, at 544.
83. See Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrele-
vant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS 201, 203-04 (1995).
84. See Nance & Morris, supra note 55, at 396.
85. See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 12, at 61-62.
86. Certain types of forensic hair analysis fall in this category. See, e.g., H. Patrick Furman,
Wrongful Convictions and the Accuracy of the Criminal Justice System, 32 COLO. LAW. 11, 22
(2003).
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laboratory errors, suppression of exculpatory scientific evidence, experts
lying about their credentials, and the like."
If we limit false convictions caused by circumstantial evidence to pure
errors, such convictions are very rare. Bedau and Radelet identified 30 cases
in which ambiguous circumstantial evidence resulted in a false conviction,
less than 9% of the false convictions in their study."8 Of the Innocence Pro-
ject's first 82 exonerations, 6% involved contaminated forensic samples and
13% resulted from misinterpretation of lab results. 9 The Northwestern In-
nocence Project found that junk science was involved in 10% of the false
capital convictions they studied,90 and forensic errors led to fewer than 2%
of the 205 false convictions C. Ronald Huff's team identified. 91
If we expand circumstantial false convictions to include hybrid errors,
the numbers fluctuate depending on the study. The Innocence Project is on
the high side: in 30% of their first 82 exonerations, "scientists and prosecu-
tors presented bad or tainted evidence to the judge or jury.' 92 By contrast, of
the 328 false convictions Gross and his coauthors examined in their 2004
study, only 7% involved perjury by a forensic scientist testifying for the
government.93
II. THE TRADITIONAL EXPLANATION AND THE WELLS EFFECT
The available data, in short, indicates that jurors overwhelmingly prefer
direct evidence to circumstantial evidence, even though circumstantial evi-
dence is far less likely to lead to false convictions. The question is-why?
A. The Traditional Explanation
The traditional explanation is based on the probability-threshold model
of juror decision-making.94 According to that model, of which Bayesian
analysis is the best known version,95 jurors will vote to convict only if their
subjective estimates of the probability of the defendant's guilt exceed the
87. See, e.g., The Innocence Project, Junk Science, http://www.innocenceproject.org/causes/
junkscience.php (last visited Aug. 7, 2006).
88. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 12, at 61-62.
89. See The Innocence Project, supra note 87. The website does not specifically indicate
that these errors did not result from human misconduct. Moreover, the numbers could be lower
because a case could have involved both pure and hybrid errors, leading to double-counting.
90. See Center on Wrongful Convictions, History, http://www.law.northwestem.edu/depts/
clinic/wrongful/history.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2006).
91. C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND
PUBLIC POLICY 64 (1996).
92. The Innocence Project, supra note 87.
93. Gross et al., supra note 79, at 543.
94. See Wells, supra note 19, at 739.
95. For an overview of probability-centered models, see Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 242-
43 (1986).
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minimum objective probability required by their understanding of "proof
96beyond a reasonable doubt"-in practice, usually around 0.82. Those sub-
jective probabilities, however, do not necessarily correspond to the objective
probability of the defendant's guilt-the probability a rational Bayesian ju-
97
ror would infer from the evidence presented at trial. That disjunction can
be problematic because if jurors' subjective probabilities are too low in a
case in which the objective probability is sufficient to convict, a false acquit-
tal will result.98
According to the traditional explanation, that is exactly what happens in
cases involving circumstantial evidence. It argues that jurors generally mis-
understand how forensic evidence like DNA and fingerprints increases the
objective probability of the defendant's guilt,99 thus causing them to infer
subjective probabilities that are too low to convict.l °
B. The Wells Effect
There is no question that the traditional explanation is at least partially
correct: the studies discussed above indicate that jurors are rarely good
Bayesians. But the traditional explanation incorrectly assumes that jurors
would be willing to convict if they did understand the probative value of
circumstantial evidence. In fact, that's not always true: as Gary Wells has
shown-and other researchers have confinrme-d''-jurors are likely to acquit
in a circumstantial case even when their subjective probabilities of guilt are
sufficient to convict. 102
Wells presented three different groups of mock jurors-judges, psychol-
ogy students, and MBA students-with the facts of a hypothetical civil case
in which a colorblind old woman, Mrs. Prob, sued the Blue Bus Company
for having run over her pet dog.10 3 Each experimental group was given the
same basic facts, then heard a transportation official testify that only two bus
96. Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt
About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEx. L. REV. 105, 127 (1999).
97. See Goodman, supra note 59, at 372.
98. See, e.g., Deborah Davis & William C. Follette, Toward an Empirical Approach to Evi-
dentiary Ruling, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 661, 678 (2003). Conversely, a false conviction will result
when the objective probability of the defendant's guilt is insufficient to convict, but jurors misunder-
stand the evidence in such a way that their subjective probabilities of the defendant's guilt are
sufficient to convict.
99. Thompson & Schumann, supra note 14, at 176; see also John C. Reinard, The Empirical
Study of the Persuasive Effects of Evidence, 15 HUM. COMM. RES. 3, 37 (1988).
100. See, e.g., Deanna L. Sykes & Joel T. Johnson, Probabilistic Evidence Versus the Repre-
sentation of an Event: The Curious Case of Mrs. Prob's Dog, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL.
199, 199 (1999).
101. See Niedermeier et al., supra note 20, at 541; see also Sykes & Johnson, supra note 100,
at 208.
102. Wells, supra note 19, at 744.
103. The case was based on Charles Nesson's famous "blue bus" scenario. See Charles Nes-
son, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1357, 1378 (1985).
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companies could have hit the dog-the Blue Bus Company and the Grey
Bus Company, each of which had an equal share of traffic in the area. Half
of each group then heard direct evidence of the Blue Bus Company's liabil-
ity, what Wells called the "weigh-attendant version" of the case:
[A] county transportation official took the stand, was sworn as a witness,
and reported that he was on duty as the weigh attendant the day of the bus-
dog incident .... In the weigh attendant's log book for the day in question,
he had entered "blue bus, 11:30 A.M." along with a weight. The dog was
hit at 11:40 and the distance from the weigh station to the point where
Mrs. Prob's dog was killed is about a 10 minute drive.
The defense attorney for the Blue Bus Company recalled the weigh station
attendant and entered evidence showing that his previous log book entries
were correct only 80% of the time and wrong 20% of the time.
'0°
The other half of each group heard circumstantial evidence of the Blue
Bus Company's guilt, what Wells called the "tire-tracks version" of the case:
[A] county transportation official took the stand and reported that he exam-
ined the dead dog and took prints of the tire tracks. These prints were then
transferred onto paper and compared to all 10 of the 10 buses owned by the
Blue Bus Company and the 10 owned by the Grey Bus Company. The
tracks matched 80% of the Blue Bus Company's buses and matched only
20% of the Grey Bus Company's buses.'0 5
Both groups were then asked to estimate the probability that the Blue
Bus Company had run over Mrs. Prob's dog and indicate whether they
would render a verdict against the company.106
The results were surprising. The experiment was designed to ensure that
the objective probability of the Blue Bus Company's guilt was the same in
both cases-80%-and more than sufficient to find the company liable.'0 7
Nevertheless, all three groups of mock jurors were substantially more likely
to find the Blue Bus Company liable in the direct evidence (weigh-
attendant) case than in the circumstantial evidence (tire-tracks) case. The
judges were four times more likely; the psychology students were five times
more likely; and the MBA students were a staggering nine times more
likely. 105
The traditional explanation of these results, of course, would be that the
mock jurors subjectively underestimated the objective probability of the
Blue Bus Company's guilt in the circumstantial case. But that explanation
was specifically contradicted by the results of the experiment. Even though
the jurors were between four and nine times less likely to convict in the
104. Wells, supra note 19, at 741. Because it was undisputed that a bus hit the dog, the proba-
tive value of the weigh attendant's identification-absent reliability concerns-was effectively 1.0.
105. Id. at 743.
106. Id. at 744.
107. Id. at 743.
108. Id. at 744.
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circumstantial case, their subjective probabilities of guilt were more than
sufficient to convict."' In fact, their mean subjective probability of guilt was
70%-the same mean subjective probability as in the direct case."
On the basis of these counterintuitive results, Wells concluded that there
is a fundamental psychological distinction between direct and circumstantial
evidence, one that makes jurors reluctant to convict in circumstantial cases.
"Psychologically, there seems to be a difference between saying that there is
an 80% chance that something is true and saying that something is true
based on evidence that is 80% reliable.""'
III. THE EASE-OF-SIMULATION HYPOTHESIS
The Wells Effect is puzzling. If jurors in a circumstantial case believed
that the evidence was sufficient to convict, why would they still be willing
to acquit? And why would that willingness not extend to direct cases?
The beginning of an answer comes from a study of the Wells Effect con-
ducted by Keith Niedermeier. In a series of three experiments designed to
test what he called the "ease-of-simulation hypothesis," Niedermeier dem-
onstrated that jurors were more willing to acquit the Blue Bus Company in
the circumstantial case because they found it easier to imagine a scenario in
which the Company did not run over Mrs. Prob's dog."3
Most relevant here is Experiment 2, which presented the Mrs. Prob sce-
nario to two groups of mock jurors. The first group heard Wells's
circumstantial tire-track version of the case, in which a transportation offi-
cial testified that the tire-tracks on the dog matched 80% of the Blue Bus
Company's buses and 20% of the Grey Bus Company's buses." 4 The second
group, by contrast, heard a version of the case in which the official testified
that the tire-track analysis produced a partial match with a blue bus and a
partial match with a grey bus, indicating that there was an 80% probability
that the blue bus ran over the dog and a 20% probability that a grey .bus did
so. " 5 Niedermeier predicted that mock jurors in the first group would find it
easier to imagine a scenario in which a blue bus did not run over the dog,
because in the complete-match condition there was "a clear, definite ...
match with at least one grey bus," whereas in the partial-match condition the
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 746.
112. See Niedermeier et al., supra note 20.
113. Id. at 537; cf Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of
Evidence, 87 VA. L. REv. 1491, 1528 (2001) (explaining that in the context of the relative plausibil-
ity theory, "the prosecution must provide a plausible account of guilt and show that there is no
plausible account of innocence").
114. See Niedermeier et al., supra note 20, at 537.
115. Id.
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only available evidence pointed strongly (though not definitively) toward a
blue bus."
6
The results of the experiment supported the ease-of-simulation hypothe-
sis. "As expected, mock jurors found it easier to imagine that a grey bus
killed the dog in the complete match conditions... than in the partial match
conditions . . . ."' Moreover, ease-of-simulation determined verdict choice:
although both groups subjectively understood that the probability of the
Blue Bus Company's guilt was more than sufficient to find the company
liable, only 26% of the complete-match jurors actually found for Mrs. Prob,
compared to 53% of the partial-match jurors. " '
Niedermeier thus concluded that the ease-of-simulation hypothesis ex-
plains Wells's finding that jurors are more reluctant to find liability when
there is an 80% chance of the defendant's guilt than when conclusive evi-
dence of the defendant's guilt is 80% reliable. In his view, the critical
difference between the two kinds of evidence is "the degree to which they
permit a juror to simulate a scenario in which the defendant is innocent." 9
As we will see, this conclusion is essential to solving the paradox of cir-
cumstantial evidence. Niedermeier's study is silent, however, on two critical
questions. First, why is the ability to imagine a factually exculpatory sce-
nario the key to acquittal? And second, why do jurors find it easier to
imagine such a scenario in a circumstantial case than in a direct case?
IV. THE SIMULATION HEURISTIC AND THE
EASE-OF-SIMULATION MODEL
This Part answers the first question: why jurors' willingness to acquit is
determined by their ability to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is
factually innocent. Section A argues that Niedermeier's study indicates that
legal decision-making is based on a cognitive mechanism known as the
"simulation heuristic."'2° Section B examines how the simulation heuristic
likely functions in the legal context. Finally, Section C sketches a general
model of jury decision-making based on the simulation heuristic.
A. The Simulation Heuristic
The simulation heuristic was initially identified by Daniel Kahneman
and Amos Tversky, two pioneers in cognitive psychology. They describe the
simulation heuristic as follows:
116. Id.
117. Id. at 538.
118. Id. The results were even more dramatic in Experiment 3, in which 16% of the complete-
match jurors and 61% of the partial-match jurors held the Blue Bus Company liable. Id. at 540.
119. ld. at541.
120. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201, 201 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982).
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There appear to be many situations in which questions about events are an-
swered by an operation that resembles the running of a simulation model
.... A simulation does not necessarily produce a single story, which starts
at the beginning and ends with a definite outcome. Rather, we construe the
output of simulation as an assessment of the ease with which the model
could produce different outcomes, given its initial conditions and operating
parameters.1
2
1
The clearest example of the simulation heuristic, according to Kahne-
man and Tversky, is "the explicit construction of scenarios as a procedure
for the estimation of probabilities."'2 2 When the heuristic is used in this way,
the probability of a particular event is determined by trying to imagine a
causal scenario12 that produces it. The easier it is to imagine such a sce-
nario, the more probable the event appears to be.1
24
Assume, for example, you want to determine the likelihood that some-
time in 2006 the United States will bomb Iran to destroy its nuclear
capabilities. One way to make that determination is to try to imagine a real-
istic geopolitical scenario that would cause the United States to take such a
drastic action. If you find it easy to imagine such a scenario, you will be-
lieve that the United States is likely to bomb Iran. But if you find it difficult
to imagine-you simply can't see it happening-you will believe that the
United States is unlikely to do so.
The basic assumption of the simulation heuristic-that the simple act of
imagining a scenario makes it seem more probable-has been validated by
research in a variety of disciplines. For example, one day before the 1976
presidential election, subjects were asked to imagine, based on detailed sce-
narios, either Jimmy Carter or Gerald Ford winning the election. The
subjects who were instructed to imagine a Carter victory were far more
likely to predict that Carter would win than subjects who were instructed to
imagine a Ford victory, and vice-versa."'
Similarly, researchers have examined the effectiveness of messages de-
signed to curb harmful behavior likely to lead to disease, such as smoking
and lung cancer. They have consistently found that such messages are more
effective when the symptoms of the disease are easy to imagine than when
they are not. 
26
As these examples indicate, though, the simulation heuristic is not nec-
essarily an accurate method for determining probabilities. "Like any other
121. Id.
122. Id. at 206.
123. A causal scenario is an "educated guess about why an event took place." Michael R.P.
Dougherty et al., The Role of Mental Simulation in Judgments of Likelihood, 70 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 135, 136 (1997).
124. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 120, at 201-02.
125. John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the Event: An
Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 88, 90-92
(1978).
126. Philip Broemer, Ease of Imagination Moderates Reactions to Differently Framed Health
Messages, 34 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 103, 115-16 (2004).
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heuristic, the simulation heuristic [is] subject to characteristic errors and
biases.' 2 7 Most obviously-and most importantly for our purposes-ease of
simulation and objective probability are not necessarily correlated: an event
can be easy to imagine yet improbable, or difficult to imagine yet prob-
able.1
28
B. The Simulation Heuristic in the Legal Context
Reaching a verdict in a criminal trial is, of course, different than guess-
ing who will win an election or predicting whether the United States will
bomb Iran. The latter decisions are forward-looking, asking individuals to
estimate the probability of a future event by trying to generate a specific
scenario that causes it. Deciding whether to convict or acquit, by contrast, is
backward-looking; the salient event-the commission of the crime-is al-
ready known. What is not known is how the crime occurred: is the
defendant responsible or not? To make that determination, jurors have to
choose between two irreconcilable accounts of the crime: an inculpatory
scenario based on the prosecution's evidence, or an exculpatory scenario
based on the defense's evidence.129 And if they choose the inculpatory sce-
nario, jurors also have to decide whether it proves the defendant's guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.3
The differences between backward-looking legal decision-making and
forward-looking applications of the simulation heuristic raise two important
questions: (1) do jurors actually use the simulation heuristic to decide cases?
and (2) if so, what does a model of jury decision-making based on the simu-
lation heuristic look like?
1. Use of the Heuristic
The best evidence for an affirmative answer to the first question is the
ease-of-simulation hypothesis discussed earlier. Although the hypothesis is
incompatible with traditional probability-centered models of jury decision-
making, it makes perfect sense if we view it as a backward-looking form of
127. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 120, at 207.
128. Deciding whether to purchase insurance provides a particularly dramatic example of
such inaccurate decision-making. Research has shown that individuals are willing to pay more for
travel insurance covering death from "any act of terrorism" than for travel insurance covering death
from "any reason." Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance Deci-
sions, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 39 (1993). The only persuasive explanation for that
asymmetry-which is not rational, given that "any reason" includes "any act of terrorism"--is that
being killed by a terrorist is easier to imagine than being killed by some unnamed cause, so it seems
more probable. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 275
(2001); see also Paul Slovic et al., Violence Risk Assessment and Risk Communication: The Effects
of Using Actual Cases, Providing Instruction, and Employing Probability Versus Frequency For-
mats, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 271,290 (2000).
129. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 157 (1999).
130. See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making:
The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519, 531 (1991).
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the simulation heuristic-one that focuses on the ease of imagining a sce-
nario that might have caused a known past event, instead of on the ease of
imagining a scenario that may cause a future event.
This idea is supported by a number of jury decision-making studies.
Green and McCloy conducted a series of experiments designed to determine
whether jurors analyzed prosecution and defense arguments by envisioning
them as causal scenarios or by assessing their quality in light of the evidence
that supported them.' The data supported the former hypothesis: "reaching
a verdict is finding an explanation, and possibly the best explanation, of the
events by a process of mental simulation."'' Similarly, Elizabeth Loftus has
concluded that when jurors listen to testimony, "they do more than simply
take in the questions and answers. While listening, they construct in their
minds an 'image' of an incident that was, of course, never witnessed by any
one of them .... Based on these constructed images, the jurors must then
reach a verdict."'33 Finally, and perhaps most famously, the central conclu-
sion of Pennington and Hastie's Story Model is that, during trial, "jurors are
engaged in an active, constructive comprehension process in which they
make sense of trial information by attempting to organize it into a coherent
mental representation."
2. Toward a Simulation-Based Model of Decision-Making
The second question-what a simulation-based model of jury decision-
making looks like-is more complicated. We know from the ease-of-
simulation hypothesis that jurors' willingness to acquit is determined by
their ability to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is factually inno-
cent. But that is only part of the answer, because it raises the most important
question: what determines how easily imagined the factually exculpatory
scenario ("FES") must be in order for jurors to acquit?
One possible answer is that the minimum imaginability of the FES is a
function of the imaginability of the factually inculpatory scenario ("FIS").
The prosecution presents its evidence first, so jurors' initial confidence in
the defendant's guilt should be determined by how easy it is for them to use
that evidence to imagine an FIS .' Jurors' final confidence in the defen-
dant's guilt-the measure that determines their verdict-would then be
131. David W. Green & Rachel McCloy, Reaching a Verdict, 9 THINKING & REASONING 307,
310 (2003).
132. Id. at 327.
133. Elizabeth F Loftus, Psychological Aspects of Courtroom Testimony, 347 N.Y. ACAD. ScI.
27, 27-28 (1980); cf BURNS, supra note 129, at 187 ("The jury will often seek to imagine, literally
to visualize, a sequence of past events in order to decide which of the two opening statements is
more adequate."); Willem A. Wagenaar, The Subjective Probability of Guilt, in SUBJECTIVE PROB-
ABILITY 529, 538 (George Wright & Peter Ayton eds., 1994) (arguing that jurors use the simulation
heuristic to determine the probability of a defendant's guilt).
134. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 190 (1992).
135. See Wagenaar, supra note 133, at 538.
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determined by how their initial confidence is affected by the imaginability
of the FES: the easier it is for jurors to imagine a scenario in which the de-
fendant is innocent, the less confident they will be that he is guilty.
Craig McKenzie's research into the relationship between prosecution
and defense cases supports this view. 1 6 By examining how jurors reacted to
pairs of cases with different strengths-strong prosecution with weak de-
fense; weak prosecution with strong defense; etc.-McKenzie demonstrated
that a defense case reduces confidence in the prosecution's case only if it
exceeds its "minimum acceptable strength," a threshold that is determined
by the strength of the prosecution's case.3 7 In fact, McKenzie found that a
defense case that fails to exceed its minimum acceptable strength actually
backfires and increases confidence in the prosecution's case.18
The ease-of-simulation hypothesis suggests that McKenzie's mock ju-
rors determined the strength of individual cases by trying to imagine them-
which means that the minimal acceptable strength of a defense case is, in
fact, its minimal acceptable imaginability. McKenzie's research thus sug-
gests that a model of jury decision-making based on the simulation heuristic
involves two basic stages. First, jurors use the prosecution's case to imagine
an FIS. The ease of imagining the FIS determines their initial confidence in
the defendant's guilt and establishes the FES's minimum acceptable imagin-
ability. Second, jurors use the defense case to imagine an FES. If the FES
exceeds its minimum acceptable imaginability, jurors' initial confidence in
the defendant's guilt decreases. If it does not, the FES backfires, increasing
jurors' initial confidence in the defendant's guilt. Once jurors have deter-
mined their final confidence in the defendant's guilt, their verdict is then
determined by the level of confidence they believe necessary to convict. If
their final confidence is higher than that level, they convict. If it is lower,
they acquit.
Needless to say, this model of jury decision-making is fundamentally
different than traditional models, all of which assume that verdicts are de-
termined by jurors' subjective probabilities of guilt.39 The ease-of-
simulation model, by contrast, assumes that verdicts are determined by a
very different-though no less subjective-measure of guilt, their "confi-
dence" or "gut-level certainty," which is a function of ease of imagination,
not probability calculations.' 4° The distinction is not just semantic, because
136. Craig R.M. McKenzie et al., When Negative Evidence Increases Confidence: Change in
Belief After Hearing Two Sides of a Dispute, 15 J. BEHAv. DECISION MAKING 1,2 (2002).
137. Id. at 14.
138. Id.; see also Edward R. Hirt et al., Activating a Mental Simulation Mind Set Through
Generation of Alternatives, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 374, 375 (2004) ("[When the
consideration of alternatives is experienced as particularly difficult, bias is amplified rather than
attenuated.").
139. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 95, at 242.
140. Paul D. Windschitl & Michael E. Young, The Influence ofAlternative Outcomes on Gut-
Level Perceptions of Certainty, 85 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 109, 111
(2001); see also Sykes & Johnson, supra note 100, at 201 ("[Tlhere may be a difference between
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the Wells Effect clearly indicates not only that "there can be a dissociation
between a person's belief in the objective probability of an event and his or
her more intuitive or 'gut-level' perceptions of certainty,"14' but also that,
when there is such a dissociation, gut-level certainty ultimately determines
verdict choice.
V. THE EASE-OF-SIMULATION MODEL APPLIED
Having outlined the ease-of-simulation model, we can now explain the
second-and most important--question Niedermeier's research leaves un-
answered: why jurors normally find it easier to imagine an FES in a
circumstantial case than in a direct case.
This Part is divided into three Sections. Section A explores four basic
epistemological differences between direct and circumstantial evidence.
Section B then explains why an FIS is generally easier to imagine in a direct
case than in a circumstantial case, thus establishing a higher minimum ac-
ceptable imaginability for the FES. Finally, Section C demonstrates why an
FES is generally easier to imagine in a circumstantial case than in a direct
case, making a circumstantial FES more likely to meet or exceed its mini-
mum acceptable imaginability and reduce jurors' confidence in the
defendant's guilt.
A. The Differences between Direct and Circumstantial Evidence
There are four basic epistemological differences between direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is representational, narrative,
univocal, and unconditional. Circumstantial evidence is abstract, rhetorical,
polyvocal, and probabilistic.
1. Representational vs. Abstract
Perhaps the most obvious difference between direct and circumstantial
evidence is that direct evidence is a verbal representation of the crime itself,
whereas circumstantial evidence is an abstract statement about the connec-
tion between the defendant and an incriminating physical trace of the crime,
such as blood or fingerprints.1
41
Consider the following direct evidence, the testimony of the key eyewit-
ness in Mumia Abu-Jamal's murder trial:
calculated probability estimations based on participants' understanding of the rules of probability
and measures affecting participants' 'gut feeling,' or subjective sense of the likelihood of an event.").
141. Windschitl & Young, supra note 140, at 111.
142. This is, of course, Locard's "transfer principle?' See KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICs: THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 93 (2001)
("It is impossible for the criminal to act, and especially to act with the force that a crime demands,
without leaving behind traces of his presence?' (translating EDMOND LocARD, L'ENQUETE
CRIMINELLE ET LES METHODES SCIENTIFIQUE (1920))).
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I was standing on the corner and I noticed the lights on top of the police
car and the spotlight in the Volkswagen was in front of the police car, and
they were pulling over to the side of Locust Street .... The driver of the
Volkswagen got out of the car. A few words passed .... The driver of the
Volkswagen then struck the police officer with a closed fist to his cheek,
and the police turned the driver of the Volkswagen around in a position to
handcuff him .... I looked across the street in the parking lot and I noticed
he was running out of the parking lot and he was practically on the curb
when he shot two times at the police officer. It was the back. The police of-
ficer turned around and staggered and seemed like he was grabbing for
something. Then he fell. Then he came over and he came on top of the po-
lice officer and shot some more times. After that he went over and he
slouched down and he sat on the curb.
43
From a legal perspective, this eyewitness testimony is important because
it proves that Abu-Jamal was the police officer's killer. From the jurors' per-
spective, though, it does more than that: it also provides a verbal
representation of the crime itself, a moment-by-moment account that helps
them imagine how the defendant actually committed it.
Contrast that with the following circumstantial evidence, testimony
about a DNA match between the defendant and a bloodstain found on a pair
of scissors used in a murder:
I tested his sample and established that in the CSF1PO his type would be
an 8,13. He is an 8,9 here; a 7,7; an 11,14; a 12,13; an 8,11; a 20,14; and
an 8,12 ... Stained Area A is an 8,13; an 8,9; 7,7; 11,14; 12,13; 8,11;
10,14; and 8,12 ... And so, therefore, on Stained Area A, which was on
the scissors, the probability that the stained area would be seen again in the
population is approximately 1 in greater than 5.5 billion
44
The DNA match is also legally sufficient to prove that the defendant
committed the murder, but there its utility ends. Unlike representational di-
rect evidence, this kind of abstract circumstantial evidence does not help
jurors imagine how the defendant committed the crime. Instead, it simply
describes the probability that the incriminating blood evidence came from
the defendant. If the jurors believe that the match is reliable, their subjective
probabilities of the defendant's guilt will increase. They will be no closer,
however, to imagining the crime itself.
2. Narrative vs. Rhetorical
In Actual Minds, Possible Worlds, Jerome Bruner distinguishes between
two modes of thought, the narrative and the rhetorical. 45 The narrative mode
involves "good stories, gripping drama, [and] believable (though not
143. Transcript of Record at 92-94, Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, Nos. 1357-1359 (testi-
mony of Cynthia White) (Pa. C.P. June 21, 1982).
144. Testimony of Carol Palmer, State v. Lovett (unpublished Virginia case, on file with au-
thor).
145. JEROME BRUNER, ACTUAL MINDS, POSSIBLE WORLDS 11 (1986).
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necessarily 'true') historical accounts."'' 46 The rhetorical mode, by contrast,
"deals in general causes, and in their establishment, and makes use of pro-
cedures to assure verifiable reference and to test for empirical truth."'147 The
two modes are complementary, but fundamentally different:
They differ radically in their procedures for verification. A good story and
a well-formed argument are different natural kinds. Both can be used as
means for convincing another. Yet what they convince of is fundamentally
different: arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelike-
ness. The one verifies by eventual appeal to procedures for establishing
formal and empirical proof. The other establishes not truth but verisimili-
tude. 
48
Because direct evidence is representational, it functions in Bruner's nar-
rative mode. Both eyewitness identifications and confessions attempt to
persuade jurors that the defendant is guilty by providing them with an alleg-
edly true historical account of how the defendant committed the crime. 49 In
a direct case, therefore, jurors do not decide whether to convict by calculat-
ing probabilities or by scrutinizing inferential chains. They simply decide
whether the eyewitness identification or the confession is believable'5-
whether it possesses the "lifelikeness" that marks it as true. If it does, there
is no question of the defendant's guilt: ideal direct evidence goes in a "sin-
gle step" to "the material issue in the case."
Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, functions in Bruner's rhetorical
mode. 1' Because it is abstract, it does not provide jurors with a historical
account of the defendant's guilt; although it can be incorporated into such
an account, it is not itself representational. On the contrary, circumstantial
evidence persuades by connecting the defendant to an incriminating "ob-
servable" of the crime, thus increasing the probability of the defendant's
guilt. Circumstantial evidence thus depends, as Bruner indicates, on "proce-
dures for establishing formal and empirical proof," not on "the imagination
of the novelist or poet."'52 It is an argument, not a story. 1
3
146. Id. at 13.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 11; see also Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, In the Mind's Eye: Transpor-
tation-Imagery Model of Narrative Persuasion, in NARRATIVE IMPACT: SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE
FOUNDATIONS 315, 332 (Melanie C. Green et al. eds., 2002) ("In rhetoric-based persuasion, mes-
sages consist of arguments; in narrative-based persuasion, stories feature images.").
149. BRUNER, supra note 145, at 21.
150. BURNS, supra note 129, at 189.
151. See Albert J. Moore, Trial By Schema: Cognitive Filters in the Courtroom, 37 UCLA L.
REV. 273, 291 (1989).
152. BRUNER,supra note 145, at II, 13.
153. See BURNS, supra note 129, at 36.
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3. Univocal vs. Polyvocal
"In order to justify the inferences of guilt" from circumstantial evidence,
William Wills once wrote, "the inculpatory facts must be incompatible with
the innocence of the accused, and incapable of explanation upon any other
reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt.' 5 4 What Wills failed to recog-
nize is that he was asking the impossible: circumstantial evidence always
permits both inculpatory and exculpatory inferences, even if those infer-
ences are not equally likely. That inferential openness, which inheres in the
very form of circumstantial evidence, is what I call its polyvocity.
Consider, for example, the murder case in which DNA analysis con-
nected the defendant to the bloodstain on the scissors used in the murder. By
itself, that evidence is sufficient to convict; jurors could reasonably infer
from the match that the defendant used the scissors to commit the murder.
But the evidence is not "incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable
hypothesis than that of his guilt." On the contrary, there are at least three
steps in the inferential chain where exculpatory inferences are still possible:
[A] suspect who provides a true match may not be the source of the trace if
the match is purely coincidental; the source of a trace may not have been at
the crime scene if the real perpetrator deliberately left the suspect's genetic
material; and, finally, the source of the trace may have left the crime scene
trace in a way that is consistent with innocence.'55
None of these possibilities, it is important to note, require the circum-
stantial evidence to be unreliable. In each case the evidence is exactly what
the prosecution claims it is. Nevertheless, the reliability of the circumstan-
tial evidence does not eliminate its polyvocity. The exculpatory possibilities
are, quite literally, endless.
1
-
6
This murder scenario is, of course, greatly oversimplified. In the real
world, the circumstantial evidence may be far more damning: the victim's
blood might have been found on the defendant's shirt, the defendant might
have had a motive to kill the victim, and so on. The concept of polyvocity,
however, does not require the exculpatory inferences to be probable--only
possible. Because if they are possible, circumstantial evidence can never be
"absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused."
Direct evidence is different. Innocence is only possible in a direct case if
the evidence is unreliable-the eyewitness was mistaken or committed per-
jury; the confession was coerced or the product of mental illness. If the
direct evidence is reliable, the defendant cannot be innocent, because, again,
154. WILLIAM WILLS, AN ESSAY ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 171
(Alfred Wills ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1881).
155. Koehler et al., supra note 83, at 203-04; see also Michael 0. Finkelstein & William B.
Fairley, The Continuing Debate Over Mathematics in the Law of Evidence: A Comment on "Trial by
Mathematics", 84 HARV. L. REV. 1801, 1805-06 (1971) ("The significance of the conclusion that a
trace came from the defendant-i.e., whether it indicates guilt, a frame-up, or mere chance-must
be left to other witnesses... ).
156. Richard D. Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism,
Hearsay, and Other Evidence, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 79, 94 (1992).
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a perfect eyewitness identification or a confession proves guilt in a single
step, without the need for inference.
Consider, for example, a variant on the murder scenario. Replace the
blood on the scissors with an eyewitness identification-a neighbor, say,
who testifies that she saw the defendant use the scissors to kill the victim. If
the jurors question the honesty or accuracy of the eyewitness, they can con-
clude that the defendant is innocent. But if they accept the eyewitness
identification, they are obligated to convict, because the identification can-
not logically be "re-narrated" into an account of how the defendant did not
commit the crime-there is no possible story in which the defendant is in-
nocent even though the witness did, in fact, see him kill the victim. Unlike
circumstantial evidence, then, direct evidence is inherently univocal. Eye-
witness identifications and confessions literally "speak in one voice"-a
voice that proclaims the defendant's guilt.
4. Unconditional vs. Probabilistic
The fourth and final difference is the logical corollary of the third. Be-
cause circumstantial evidence is inherently polyvocal, consistent with both
innocence and guilt, it is also inherently probabilistic-its probative value is
always less than 1.0. The evidence may make guilt extremely likely: the
exculpatory inference(s) the defendant asks jurors to draw may stretch cre-
dulity to the breaking point. But it can never unconditionally prove the
defendant's guilt.
57
In the strong version of the murder case, for example, a rational Bayes-
ian juror may conclude that the probability of the defendant's guilt is 0.98 in
light of the bloodstain on the scissors, the victim's blood on the defendant's
shirt, and the motive evidence. She cannot rationally conclude that the prob-
ability of the defendant's guilt is 1.0, however, because that would mean
there are no exculpatory inferences consistent with that circumstantial evi-
dence. And that is simply not possible, given the inherent polyvocity of
circumstantial evidence.
Direct evidence, by contrast, is unconditional, not probabilistic. A per-
fect eyewitness identification says, "I saw the defendant commit the crime."
A defendant's confession admits, "I committed the crime." In both cases,
unless jurors question the reliability of the evidence-and we've seen that
they normally don't-the probative value of the evidence is 1.0.
B. Imagining the Factually Inculpatory Scenario
We can now turn to the first stage of the ease-of-simulation model,
imagining the factually inculpatory scenario (FIS). For three reasons, jurors
normally find it easier to imagine an FIS in a direct case than in a circum-
157. Nesson, supra note 103, at 1371 ("In the circumstantial evidence case, even if the jury
believed all of the evidence, it still could not generate a verdict that the public could understand as
other than a bet.").
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stantial case: (1) direct evidence is representational, while circumstantial
evidence is abstract; (2) direct evidence generally provides a more structur-
ally coherent story than circumstantial evidence; and (3) direct evidence is
vivid, while circumstantial evidence is pallid.
Before proceeding, it is important to emphasize again that we are inter-
ested in the FIS that jurors try to imagine based on the evidence presented at
trial. In some cases, the prosecution attempts to facilitate the imaginative
process by using its opening argument to present jurors with a narrative ac-
count of how the defendant committed the crime. Narrative opening
arguments are the exception, however, not the rule; more often, the prosecu-
tion uses a rhetorical opening argument that outlines how the various items
of evidence will prove the necessary elements of the crime.18 When the
prosecution makes use of a rhetorical opening argument instead of a narra-
tive one, jurors have to imagine an FIS on their own. And even when the
prosecution does use a narrative opening argument, there is no guarantee
that the FIS jurors imagine will match the prosecution's narrative; indeed,
differences are not only possible but likely. 59
1. Event Representation
The fundamental reason a direct FIS is normally easier to imagine than a
circumstantial FIS is that direct evidence is representational, while circum-
stantial evidence is abstract. By providing the jury with a narrative
representation of how the defendant committed the crime, eyewitness identi-
fications and confessions make it easy for jurors to imagine an FIS-they
simply have to translate the narrative into its "obvious perceptual analog."' 6
Indeed, the process of imagination occurs automatically: similar to becom-
ing lost in a book, jurors become immersed in the nonfictional world
narrated by the eyewitness, mentally imagining the specific events as the
eyewitness describes them. 
6
1
According to Daniel Gilbert, there may, in fact, be an evolutionary basis
for visualizing events an eyewitness describes.16 Human beings have always
been social animals, dependent upon others-parents, friends, strangers-
for their survival. In earlier eras, interdependency put a premium on com-
munication: humans who were able to communicate quickly and effectively
with each other survived and reproduced; humans who could not died out.
Such communication required listeners to be able to quickly imagine
158. See Pennington & Hastie, supra note 134, at 190 n.1; see also Richard Lempert, Telling
Tales in Court. Trial Procedures and the Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 559, 561 (1991).
159. See Dale A. Nance, Naturalized Epistemology and the Critique of Evidence Theory, 87
VA. L. REv. 1551, 1575 (2001).
160. Sykes & Johnson, supra note 100, at 209.
161. See, e.g., VICTOR NELL, LOST IN A BOOK: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF READING FOR PLEASURE
246 (1988) (concluding that "imagery is an essential aspect of the reading experience" for all read-
ers, "good and poor imagers alike," and that "the reader, using a ready-made store of images, at once
sees the whole picture-mistily, perhaps, but well enough").
162. Daniel T. Gilbert, How Mental Systems Believe, 46 AM. PSYCHOL. 107, 116 (1991).
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speakers' firsthand reports of specific events: enemy attacks, the presence of
animals to hunt, etc. Evolution thus favored humans skilled in imagination
over those who were unskilled, ultimately creating a perceptual system in
which, at least initially, "an assertion by another person about a physical
event is treated in the same manner as an actual apprehension of that event
by our perceptual system."'
6 3
The key here is that direct evidence is a representation of a "physical
event"-the crime itself. Circumstantial evidence does not provide the jury
with a representation of the crime; it is simply an abstract probabilistic
statement about the defendant's relationship to one of its incriminating
physical traces. Unlike direct evidence, then, circumstantial evidence does
not facilitate jurors' ability to imagine an FIS. How do jurors imagine a
statement like "the probability that the stained area would be seen again in
the population is approximately 1 in greater than 5.5 billion"? What is its
"perceptual analog"? Such abstract evidence appeals to jurors' understand-
ing of the law's "procedures for establishing formal and empirical proof,"
not to their imaginations.
Moreover, even if jurors conclude that an item of circumstantial evi-
dence did in fact come from the defendant, thus increasing the subjective
probability of his guilt, that evidence still does not help them imagine how
the defendant actually committed the crime. At best, it provides them with a
small piece of the overall visual puzzle. If jurors accept the prosecution's
claim that the bloodstain on the scissors came from the defendant, for ex-
ample, that evidence only allows them to imagine that at some unknown
time the defendant held the scissors. It does not provide them with an image
of how the murder itself occurred. And even the image of the defendant with
the scissors is an unstable one. Because of the inherent polyvocity of cir-
cumstantial evidence, there are many other possible images consistent with
the bloodstain: that the real killer planted the defendant's blood on the scis-
sors after he committed the crime himself; that the blood got on the scissors
through earlier, innocent contact; and so on.
To imagine an FIS in a circumstantial case, then, jurors always have to
rely on multiple items of circumstantial evidence. Each item is a small piece
of the visual puzzle; enough items might reveal the puzzle itself. The real
question, then, is whether jurors are normally able to weave the various
items of evidence in a circumstantial case into an easily imagined account of
how the defendant committed the crime. The answer, I believe, is probably
not. As the next two Sections demonstrate, a circumstantial FIS is unlikely
to be either structurally coherent or vivid, the two factors that determine its
ease of imagination.
2. Structural Coherence
A considerable amount of empirical research indicates that the structural
coherence of an FIS is critical to its imaginability. A study that examined the
163. Sykes & Johnson, supra note tOO, at 202; see also Gilbert, supra note 162, at 116.
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effectiveness of opening arguments in four hypothetical murder cases, for
example, concluded that the structural coherence of an opening argument is
"critical to narrative quality"' 64 and particularly important to an argument'sS 165
persuasiveness. Another study found that because jurors "judge the plau-
sibility of a story according to [its] structural relations,"' 66 it is possible that
"a well-constructed story may sway judgments even when evidence is in
short supply.'', 7 A third study extended that conclusion even further, finding
that "[c]oherence in statements (non-contradictory vs. contradictory) in a
narrative is more important in judgments of guilt and plausibility than the
amount of evidence."'
68
These studies focus on the relationship between structural coherence and
narrative quality, not between structural coherence and imaginability.
Melanie Green's transportation-imagery model, however, indicates that
high-quality narratives are persuasive precisely because they facilitate
• • • 169
imagination. That makes sense: when individuals receive information se-
quentially-as jurors do in a trial-they comprehend it sequentially as well,
creating layers of information and mapping each new item of information
onto previous items until global comprehension is achieved. And "the more
the incoming information coheres with the previous information, the easier
it is to map."'"7
Structural coherence, it is important to note, is not a unitary phenome-
non. In fact, Morton Gemsbacher suggests that a narrative's overall
structural coherence is determined by the interplay of four different kinds of
coherence: referential, locational, temporal, and causal. 17' A narrative is ref-
erentially coherent when it refers to the same actors and events,1
72
locationally coherent when its events take place at the same location,171 tem-porally coherent when its events take place in a common time frame, 74 and
164. James F. Voss et al., On the Use of Narrative as Argument, in NARRATIVE COMPREHEN-
SION, CAUSALITY, AND COHERENCE 235, 244 (Susan R. Goldman et al. eds., 1999).
165. Id. at 248.
166. W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM 65 (1981).
167. Id. at 68. The authors noted that the converse may be true, as well, namely, that "ade-
quately documented but poorly structured accounts will be rejected because they do not withstand
careful scrutiny within a story framework." Id. at 67-68.
168. B. Klettke & A.C. Graesser, Coherence and Evidence in Testimony Evaluation on Incest
Narratives (July 19-21, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, presented at the Tenth Annual Meeting of
the Society for Text and Discourse); see also BENNETT & FELDMAN, supra note 166, at 88
("[Riegardless of a story's actual truth status, the more ambiguous the story is in... structural terms
... the less plausible it is.").
169. See Green & Brock, supra note 148, at 319.
170. MORTON ANN GERNSBACHER, LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION AS STRUCTURE BUILDING 52
(1990).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 53.
173. Id. at 58.
174. Id. at56.
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causally coherent when it explains the occurrence of its events in a consis-
tent way.'75 With those four "sub-coherences" in mind, we can examine the
relative structural coherence of direct and circumstantial factually inculpa-
tory scenarios.
a. Direct Evidence
Because eyewitness identifications and confessions are narrative repre-
sentations of the crime itself, a direct FIS normally possesses all four kinds
of coherence.
i. Referential, Locational, and Temporal Coherence
A direct FIS tends to be referentially and locationally coherent because
it focuses on a specific location-the scene of the crime-and involves a
discrete number of actors, usually the defendant, the victim, and the witness
providing the direct evidence. The eyewitness situation is the most obvious
example: the witness simply describes how she saw the defendant commit
the crime. A confession can be more complicated, because it may also in-
clude statements about motive, post-crime concealment, and the like, but the
fact that it is a first-person narrative ensures that all of the actors and events
it contains will be configured around the defendant's own actions.
A direct FIS is also usually temporally coherent. Although "evidence is
presented at trial in a disconnected question and answer format,"'17 6 the most
natural way for the prosecution to elicit testimony from an eyewitness is to
ask questions that allow her to describe what she saw chronologically.
17
Confessions, moreover, are riot even broken up by the prosecution's ques-
tions; they are read into the record by a police officer or, where taped,
played for the jurors.
ii. Causal Coherence
The causal coherence of a direct FIS is normally guaranteed by the nar-
rative structure of direct evidence. For a narrative to be causally coherent:
[I]t must be more than a "simple succession" or "enumeration of events in
serial order"; it must be "a configuration." This configuration has a part-
whole structure of a particular type: In Aristotle's famous dictum describ-
ing the prerequisites of a proper, complete story, "a thing is a whole if it
has a beginning, a middle, and an end." A story is conceptualized as
175. Id. at 61.
176. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 95, at 244.
177. See, e.g., Janeen Kerper, The Art and Ethics of Direct Examination, 22 AM. J. TRIAL
Aovoc. 377, 381 (1998).
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movement along a path, the sequence of its events configured by means of
the source-path-goal schema. 178
Both eyewitness identifications and confessions are configurations, not
"simple successions," because they structure their events according to the
source-path-goal schema that Winter identifies as emblematic of a causally
coherent narrative. A confession is the clearest example: it not only unfolds
"in serial order," each action leading to the next, it involves the defendant
himself (the source) describing how he actually committed the crime (the
path) and what motivated him to commit it (the goal). Similarly, although an
eyewitness identification does not explain the defendant's motive, it still
follows a classic version of the source-path-goal schema: it begins with the
victim before the crime (the protagonist), describes how the defendant en-
countered the victim and how they interacted with each other (the antagonist
+ the agon"7), and concludes with what happened after the crime was com-
mitted (the destination). s0
Critical, here, is the fact that both eyewitness identifications and confes-
sions rely on cause-to-consequence reasoning. Formally, criminal trials are
structured consequence-to-cause: the consequence is known (the crime it-
self), and the purpose of the trial is to determine whether the defendant is
the cause (the perpetrator). Eyewitness identifications and confessions, how-
ever, temporarily reverse that relationship: the witness identifies the
defendant as the perpetrator (the cause) and explains how the defendant
committed the crime (the consequence). That temporary reversal is what
creates direct evidence's causal coherence. As Tversky and Kahneman point
out, individuals find it "more natural and easier to follow the normal se-
quence and reason from causes to consequences than to invert this sequence
and reason from consequences to causes."''
The causal coherence of a direct FIS is strengthened, moreover, by its
semantic absolutism. Witnesses and prosecutors rarely use equivocated ex-
pressions like "might have," "strongly indicates," and "almost certainly" in a
case that is based on direct evidence, because such evidence, if reliable,
conclusively establishes the defendant's guilt. From a cognitive standpoint,
that causal absolutism is critical to jurors' ability to imagine an FIS. Re-
search has found that "the use of probabilistic wording or wording that
reduces causal certainty, especially when such wording provides a sense of
doubt about some aspect of the accused's role in committing the crime,"
dramatically reduces the structural coherence-and thus imaginability-of a
narrative. 182
178. Steven L. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Nar-
rative Meaning, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2225, 2235-36 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted).
179. Understood as the conflict between the antagonist and protagonist. Id. at 2238.
180. Id.
181. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments Under Uncertainty,
in 1 PROGRESS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 49, 50-51 (Martin Fishbein ed., 1980),
182. Voss et al., supra note 164, at 246.
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b. Circumstantial Evidence
Circumstantial evidence is rhetorical, not narrative-it persuades by in-
creasing the probability of the defendant's guilt, not by presenting jurors
with a compelling account of how he committed the crime. The rhetorical
nature of circumstantial evidence normally ensures that a circumstantial FIS
lacks structural coherence, particularly in comparison to a direct FIS.
i. Referential and Locational Coherence
Like a direct FIS, a circumstantial FIS focuses on reconstructing the
crime itself. A circumstantial FIS, however, cannot focus solely on the ac-
tions of the victim and the defendant, because their actions must be inferred
from items of evidence that are discovered, collected, processed, and ex-
plained by other individuals. The prosecution necessarily relies on the
actions of those individuals to establish the admissibility of the circumstan-
tial evidence. 3 By doing so, however, it decreases the referential coherence
of the FIS.
For similar reasons, a circumstantial FIS is also less locationally coher-
ent than a direct FIS. Because circumstantial evidence consists primarily of
physical traces of the crime, such evidence is likely to be scattered far be-
yond the spatial confines of the crime scene. Moreover, the FIS has to
account for all of the locations involved in the collection and processing of
the circumstantial evidence-a lesson the O.J. Simpson prosecutors learned
the hard way when they failed to explain why Detective Vannatter carried
Simpson's blood between the Bundy and Rockingham e '
ii. Temporal Coherence
To assess the temporal coherence of a circumstantial FIS, we need to
distinguish between cases in which the prosecution uses a narrative opening
argument and cases in which it uses a rhetorical one. When the prosecution
uses a rhetorical opening argument, jurors are unlikely to imagine a tempo-
rally coherent FIS, because in a circumstantial case the prosecution rarely, if
ever, structures its case-in-chief as a chronological narrative-evidence of
planning coming before evidence of commission, evidence of commission
coming before evidence of concealment, and so on. For example, the prose-
cution generally asks an expert scientific witness to discuss all of the
physical evidence that falls within his or her expertise, even if that evidence
was generated at different times during the crime."' Similarly, the prosecu-
183. See, e.g, State v. Morel, 676 A.2d 1347, 1356 (R.I. 1996).
184. See Mark Davis & Larry Copeland, Jurors Defend Decision to Acquit, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Oct. 5, 1995, atAt.
185. See Lempert, supra note 158, at 566. During the Simpson trial, for example, Dennis
Fung, an LAPD criminalist, discussed the forensic evidence he found in Simpson's white Bronco, at
Simpson's Rockingham estate, and then at Bundy. A chronological presentation would have been
Bundy, Bronco, Rockingham.
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tion often introduces all of its scientific evidence at one time, regardless of
chronology. 8 6 Other common examples include calling the arresting officer
as the first witness,1 87 presenting motive evidence at the end of the case for
rhetorical effect, 18 and calling the coroner early in the case to establish
cause and time of death.'89 It is extremely difficult for jurors to weave such
temporally disordered items of evidence into a unified chronological ac-
count of how the defendant committed the crime. As Jean Matter Mandler
points out, because the elements of a story are "recognized primarily be-
cause of what has gone before," the movement of an element "to another
place in the story is apt to cause the listener trouble."'9
If the prosecution uses a narrative opening argument, jurors are more
likely to imagine a temporally coherent FIS, because the argument will help
them keep track of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presents in
its case-in-chief.' But even then there is no guarantee: it is still possible
that the temporal coherence of the opening argument will be overwhelmed
by the "unpersuasive jumble of facts" created by the prosecution's decision
to have its witnesses testify out of story order.'
92
iii. Causal Coherence
A circumstantial FIS is also likely to be less causally coherent than a di-
rect FIS. Most importantly, because circumstantial evidence is rhetorical,
not narrative, it necessarily relies on consequence-to-cause reasoning: the
consequences of the crime (the circumstantial evidence) are proof of its
cause (the defendant). As already noted, such reasoning is particularly diffi-
cult for jurors to follow.
193
The impact of the consequence-to-cause nature of circumstantial evi-
dence should be most severe when the prosecution uses a rhetorical opening
argument and presents its evidence in witness order. In such cases, jurors
have to weave evidence that lacks referential, locational, and temporal co-
herence into a causally coherent account of the defendant's guilt on their
186. In the Simpson case, all of the experts involved in the collection and processing of the
DNA evidence testified in succession. See M.L. RANTALA, O.J. UNMASKED: THE TRIAL, THE
TRUTH, AND THE MEDIA 222 (1996).
187. Lempert, supra note 158, at 562.
188. The trial of Rich Tabish and Sandy Murphy for killing casino owner Ted Binion is an
example.
189. This was done, for example, in the Sam Sheppard trial.
190. JEAN MATTER MANDLER, STORIES, SCRIPTS, AND SCENES: ASPECTS OF SCHEMA THEORY
25-26 (1984); see also Loftus, supra note 133, at 33 ("Perhaps it is easier for jurors to work with a
smooth account, modifying it here and there depending upon subsequent evidence, than to take
small fragments and weave them together into a coherent image.").
191. See Lempert, supra note 158, at 564.
192. Id.
193. See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 181, at 50.
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own-a nearly impossible task, as Pennington and Hastie's research into the
effect of evidence presentation on story construction has shown.1
9 4
Moreover, even if the prosecution does use a narrative opening argu-
ment, jurors may still be unable to imagine a causally coherent FIS. First, as
with temporal coherence, the causal coherence of the prosecution's FIS may
simply be overwhelmed by the non-narrative structure of evidence presented
out of story order. Indeed, that possibility seems even more likely with
causal coherence, given that weaving disparate events into a source-path-
goal configuration requires more than just arranging them chronologically.' 95
Second, whatever causal coherence the prosecution's circumstantial FIS
does possess will inevitably be undermined by its lack of semantic absolut-
ism. Because circumstantial evidence is inherently probabilistic, expert
witnesses and prosecutors in a circumstantial case have to qualify their fac-
tual assertions with expressions like "might have," "strongly indicates," and
"almost certainly." Such qualifiers, however, undermine the causal coher-
196
ence of an FIS. A mock juror in Voss's study put it best when asked to
explain why a causally "soft" opening argument didn't make sense to him-
"[y]ou should not have used the word probably so much."'197
3. Vividness
Even if jurors do manage to imagine a structurally coherent FIS in a cir-
cumstantial case, that scenario is unlikely to be vivid-the other factor that
determines the imaginability of an FIS. The vividness of an item of evidence
is determined by three factors: (a) its emotional interest; (b) its concrete-
ness; and (c) its sensory, temporal, and spatial proximity.'98 All three factors
indicate that a circumstantial FIS is generally more pallid than a direct FIS.
a. Emotional Interest
Although the underlying crime in a circumstantial case might be emo-
tionally compelling, circumstantial evidence itself is not. Base rates,
likelihood ratios, and random-match probabilities are important, but they do
not make for gripping testimony. Moreover, it can take hours, if not days,
for an expert to explain forensic evidence to the jury, which is why prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys continually obsess over ways to make the
presentation of such evidence more interesting.'99
194. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 130, at 542.
195. See Winter, supra note 178, at 2235.
196. James F. Voss & Julie A. Van Dyke, Narrative Structure, Information Certainty, Emo-
tional Content, and Gender as Factors in a Pseudo Jury Decision-Making Task, 32 DISCOURSE
PROCESSES 215, 234 (2001) ("[N]arrative statements providing uncertainty produce an overall per-
ception of [a].. . narrative as indefinite.").
197. Voss et al., supra note 164, at 245.
198. See RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE 45 (1980).
199. See, e.g., Steven P. Breaux, Is Forensic Animation Right for Your Case?, TRIAL, Nov.
2003, at 66.
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Direct evidence, by contrast, epitomizes the fascination of criminal tri-
als. The sleazy informant forced to confess on the stand that he is the real
killer, the black youth whose life depends on convincing twelve white jurors
that white cops beat his "confession" out of him-these are the moments
that sell books and pack theaters. To be sure, most criminal trials that turn
on an eyewitness identification or a confession lack such Perry Mason mo-
ments. But even "ordinary" direct testimony can't help but engage jurors'
emotions, because as the witness testifies they become witnesses to the
crime themselves, watching it unfold in their minds as if they had actually
been there.2 °
b. Concreteness
The difference between direct and circumstantial evidence is even
starker in terms of their concreteness, "the degree of detail and specificity
about actors, actions, and situational context" they provide. 20 1 Circumstantial
evidence is pallid and abstract; the only detail or specificity it provides
about a crime is that its commission left behind a physical trace consistent
with the defendant's guilt. And even that statement goes too far: because
circumstantial evidence is inherently probabilistic, it can only establish the
likelihood that the trace belongs to the defendant or the victim.
Direct evidence, by comparison, always provides a great deal of detail
202
and specificity about a crime. Because eyewitness identifications and con-
fessions are narrative representations of the crime itself, they necessarily
provide jurors with a rich description of its events. 20 The snippet of eyewit-
ness testimony from Abu-Jamal's trial is a perfect example: in a few lines, it
manages to convey a great deal of information about who the victim and the
murderer were, what the murderer did, and in what context the murder took
place.204
c. Proximity
Finally, direct evidence is more proximately vivid than circumstantial
evidence. "There is much anecdotal evidence that information obtained first-
hand, through one's own sensory apparatus, is more vivid and likely to exert
an impact on one's judgments and inferences than is information obtained
verbally from a secondhand or thirdhand source., 20 5 Both direct and circum-
stantial evidence are communicated secondhand, through the verbal
200. See Green & Brock, supra note 148, at 324.
201. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 198, at 47.
202. The amount of detail and specificity an eyewitness or confession provides, of course,
will not always be the same. See Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the Court-
room, 49 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 660 (1985).
203. Loftus, supra note 133, at 31.
204. See supra text accompanying note 143.
205. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 198, at 50.
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testimony of a witness. For evolutionary reasons, however, "an assertion by
another person about a physical event is treated in the same manner as an
actual apprehension of that event by our perceptual system."2° Direct evi-
dence involves such assertions; circumstantial evidence doesn't. As a result,
jurors will process direct evidence as if they were witnessing the crime
themselves, making it seem more spatially, temporally, and sensorially
proximate than circumstantial evidence.
d. Vividness and Imagination
All three factors, in short, indicate that direct evidence is far more vivid
than circumstantial evidence. That difference is critical, because vivid evi-
dence is easier to imagine than pallid evidence: "the degree of detail and
specificity about actors, actions, and situational context .... contribute to
the 'imaginability' of information, that is, its tendency to prompt sensory
imagery."207 Vivid evidence, with its "rich description of events,"208 provides
jurors with a great deal of information they can use to imagine the witness's
description of the crime; pallid evidence, with its abstraction and emotional
sterility, does not.2
The implications of the positive correlation between vividness and
imaginability are profound. To begin with, their relationship means that di-
rect evidence will be easy for jurors to imagine, no matter how unreliable it
may be. The eyewitness might be lying or mistaken. The defendant's con-
fession might have been coerced. Either way, jurors will still find it easy to
imagine how the crime could have happened the way the eyewitness or the
defendant says it did-and will thus find it even easier to overlook questions
about that testimony's reliability.
Equally important, the correlation also means that jurors will find it dif-
ficult to imagine circumstantial evidence, no matter how probative it might
be. As Richard Nisbett and Lee Ross point out:
The most disconcerting implication of the principle that information is
weighted in proportion to its vividness is that certain types of highly pro-
bative information will have little effect on inferences merely because they
are pallid. Aggregated, statistical, data-summary information is often par-
ticularly robative, but it is also likely to lack concreteness and emotional
interest.210
206. Supra note 163.
207. NISBETT & Ross, supra note 198, at 47; see also Bell & Loftus, supra note 202, at 660
("[V]ivid, detailed information may have a greater affective impact than pallid information, perhaps
because of its imaginable attributes."); Carroll, supra note 125, at 94 ("The effect of the imagination
instructions may depend upon the provision of a relatively detailed, vivid, and concrete scenario.").
208. Loftus, supra note 133, at 33.
209. See, e.g., L. Bensi et al., Vividness in Judgments of Guilt, 97 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR
SKILLS 1133, 1136 (2003).
210. NIsBETr & Ross, supra note 198, at 55; see also Carroll, supra note 125, at 95.
[Vol. 105:241
The Cognitive Psychology
Items of circumstantial evidence, of course, do not stand or fall on their
own. As discussed earlier, jurors will attempt to imagine an FIS through all
of the circumstantial evidence in a case, with or without the prosecution's
help. Nevertheless, given that individual items of circumstantial evidence
are generally pallid,"' there is no reason to believe that a circumstantial FIS
will be any more vivid.
Consider, for example, a murder trial in which Jack is accused of giving
his bipolar wife, Jill, a lethal dose of Lithium. The prosecution's case is
based on four items of circumstantial evidence: Jack's skin was found under
Jill's fingernails; Jack had fresh scratch-marks on his cheek; Jack waited 20
minutes to call 911 and sounded calm on the phone; and the couple had re-
cently purchased $1 million of additional life insurance for Jill naming Jack
as the beneficiary. The evidence is probably sufficient for jurors to imagine
a structurally coherent FIS in which Jack forced Jill to swallow the Lithium,
despite being scratched by her as she tried to resist. That scenario, however,
is little more than a "bare narrative of the movements in space or time";1' 2 it
has none of the detail and texture that is inherent in direct evidence-a con-
fession, for example:
Yeah I did it, and I'm not sorry neither I earned that money, every last
cent. You got no idea the hell I put up with ... twenty years, nothing but
her screaming and crying and pickin' at me ... All I ever heard was how
she hated me and her life and how she wished she wasn't even here, and so
I made that happen, and I'm not sorry. She was too crazy to get out of bed
without her Lithium, so I made sure she got plenty. A few extra doses, and
that was it. Sure she fought it, but the crazy witch wasn't gonna claw my
hand away. I shoved the pills in her mouth and held her jaw shut and it's
been quiet ever since. And I'm not sorry, neither
A narrative opening argument would, of course, help close the gap be-
tween the bare narrative and the confession. But the gap would still remain.
Consider the following opening argument:
What will the evidence show? First and foremost, that Jill did not commit
suicide, as the defense would have you believe. The defendant had reasons
to kill her that night-one million of them. And kill her he did. He entered
the room, held her down, and forced her to take a massive overdose of
Lithium. How do we know that? The defendant's skin was found under her
fingernails, and he had fresh scratch marks on his face. That means Jill
struggled with the defendant, fighting desperately-and vainly-for her
life. Those are not the acts of a suicidal woman. And then there's the 911
call. The defendant waited twenty minutes after his beloved wife suppos-
edly OD'ed to call for an ambulance-and didn't even bother to sound
upset. Why? Because this was a murder not a suicide, and he needed time
to get rid of the evidence and figure out what he was going to tell the po-
lice ....
211. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 133, at 33.
212. BURNS, supra note 129, at 185.
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This is not a bad scenario-it provides a clear and logical explanation
for the three items of circumstantial evidence. But it is nowhere near as
vivid as the confession, nor can it be-if the prosecutor tried to equal the
confession's vividness by embellishing his opening argument, the judge
would almost certainly sustain a defense objection that he was being argu-
mentative.1 3
C. Priming the Imagination of a Factually Exculpatory Scenario
A factually inculpatory scenario, in short, is generally more difficult for
jurors to imagine in a circumstantial case than in a direct case. As a result,
the minimum acceptable imaginability of the factually exculpatory scenario
is usually lower in a circumstantial case. That lower minimum has two im-
plications: (1) it is easier for the FES in a circumstantial case to exceed its
minimum acceptable imaginability and reduce jurors' initial confidence in
the defendant's guilt; and (2) the FES in a circumstantial case does not have
to reduce jurors' initial confidence as much in order for them to acquit.
We cannot necessarily assume, however, that jurors always try to imag-
ine an FES. On the contrary, research into counterfactual thinking indicates
that jurors must be "primed" to do So4-and that they are far more likely to
be strongly primed to imagine an FES in a circumstantial case than in a di-
rect case. This Section explains why.
1. The Need for Priming
Most judgmental heuristics function automatically-whenever it is ap-
propriate for an individual to use them, he or she will.215 "Unlike other
heuristics," however, "the simulation heuristic is less automatic and needs
some prodding to be activated."216 Left to their own devices, in other words,
individuals do not always try to imagine alternatives to an initial scenario; if
the initial scenario is sufficiently plausible, they may "cease the simulation
process and fail to consider alternative scenarios that imply a different out-
come.
217
Because the simulation of alternative scenarios requires priming, we
cannot assume that jurors always try to imagine an FES in a criminal case. If
the successful simulation of a focal scenario inhibits the simulation of alter-
native scenarios, jurors may not try to imagine an FES in a case that
involves an easily imagined FIS. Empirical research supports that conclu-
213. See, e.g., Hengel v. Thompson, 272 P.2d 1058, 1060-61 (Kan. 1954).
214. Adam D. Galinsky & Gordon B. Moskowitz, Counterfactuals as Behavioral Primes:
Priming the Simulation Heuristic and Consideration of Alternatives, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC.
PSYCHOL. 384, 391 (2000).
215. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 198, at 18.
216. Galinsky & Moskowitz, supra note 214, at 386 (citation omitted).
217. Edward R. Hirt & Keith D. Markman, Multiple Explanation: A Consider-an-Alternative
Strategy for Debiasing Judgments, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1069, 1084 (1995).
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sion: an ambitious study involving a hypothetical theft, for example, found
that twenty-five percent of mock juries "articulated only a single interpreta-
tion of the case." 18
If jurors do not even attempt to imagine an alternative to the FIS, the de-
fendant will be convicted in all but the weakest cases.2 9 An FIS that is
imaginable enough to interrupt the simulation heuristic is almost certainly
one that is imaginable enough to convict; otherwise, why would jurors lose
interest in the defendant's possible innocence? In the absence of an FES,
therefore, jurors' initial confidence in the defendant's guilt will become their
final confidence-and the defendant will be convicted.
2. When Priming Occurs
Priming jurors to consider an FES is, in short, almost always a necessary
condition of an acquittal. It is thus imperative that we understand when-
and why-such priming is likely to occur.
To date, no study has addressed priming in the legal context. Nonlegal
research, however, indicates that priming is determined by two factors:
whether the structure of the decision-making task encourages the considera-
tion of alternative scenarios; and whether the nature of the decision itself
involves "negative affect" such as fear or regret."O
The first factor suggests that attempting to imagine an FES should be the
norm, not the exception. A criminal trial has an explicitly binary structure:
jurors are asked to determine whether the defendant is guilty or innocent. To
some extent, therefore, jurors should always be primed to imagine an FES
simply by the nature of their decision-making task.
The key here is "to some extent." Not all priming is alike; alternative
scenarios "can differ dramatically in the attention or weight they receive
when a focal outcome is being judged. 22' Priming created by the binary na-
ture of a criminal trial itself likely falls on the weak end of the spectrum: if
jurors are very confident that the defendant is guilty (as a result of an easily
imagined FIS), they have little incentive to try to imagine how the defendant
might be innocent-and individuals conserve their cognitive resources
122
whenever possible.
The second factor, by contrast-whether the decision involves negative
affect-is likely to lead to far stronger priming. With negative affect, prim-
ing results not from the nature of the decision-making task, but from its
218. James A. Holstein, Jurors' Interpretations and Jury Decision Making, 9 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 83, 93 (1985).
219. The ease-of-simulation model does not rule out the possibility that some prosecution
cases will be so difficult to imagine that jurors will refuse to convict even in the absence of an easily
imagined FES.
220. Neal J. Roese, Counterfactual Thinking, 121 PSYCHOL. BULL. 133, 135 (1997).
221. Windschitl & Young, supra note 140, at 131.
222. David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of Confir-
matory Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 892, 893 (1993).
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importance to the individual's well-being: "[n]egative affect signals to the
organism that a problem needs rectifying, and counterfactual thinking... is
mobilized to confront the problem.""' Affect-based priming, in other words,
occurs "where corrective thinking is most essential." 24
Does a criminal trial involve the kind of negative affect that might be
sufficient to create strong priming? I would suggest there is an obvious can-
didate: the fear offalsely convicting the defendant.21 Jurors believe that they
"should make accurate determinations with respect to the actual guilt or in-
nocence of the defendant,' 226 and they experience considerable stress in
trying to comply with that self-imposed mandate.227 Moreover, jurors consis-
tently report that choosing a verdict is the most stressful aspect of a criminal
case.228 It makes sense, then, that the fear of a false conviction would prime
jurors to put significant effort into imagining a scenario in which the defen-
dant might be innocent: if they succeed, they can acquit; if they fail, they
can convict knowing that they took their obligation as jurors seriously. Ei-
ther way, their fear is alleviated-the goal of counterfactual thinking.229
This theory of priming, of course, does not explain why a circumstantial
case is more likely to generate stronger priming than a direct case. The pos-
sibility of a false conviction exists in all criminal cases. The theory would
thus seem to suggest that strong priming is equally likely to occur in direct
cases.
Looks, however, can be deceiving. It is true that both direct and circum-
stantial cases can lead to false convictions. But they do so in different ways:
in a direct case, jurors falsely convict because they rely on unreliable evi-
dence; in a circumstantial case, jurors falsely convict because they rely on
(normally) reliable evidence that cannot exclude the possibility that the de-
fendant is innocent.23° That difference may not be legally important, but in
fact empirical research into the psychology of risk indicates that jurors will
only fear falsely convicting the defendant in the latter situation, in which the
evidence cannot prove his guilt to an absolute certainty.
223. Roese, supra note 220, at 135.
224. Id. at 143.
225. See, e.g., Laith Alattar et al., Poster Presented at the Society for Judgment and Decision
Making Annual Conference, Wrongful Convictions vs. Wrongful Acquittals: Who Sees Which as
Worse, and Why? (Nov. 13, 2005) (finding that nearly eighty percent of jurors view a false convic-
tion as worse than a false acquittal). This is not to say that the fear of a false acquittal is
unimportant; as noted above, it helps explain why jurors will try to imagine a factually inculpatory
scenario even if the prosecution does not provide them with one. The fear of false acquittal is irrele-
vant, though, to whether jurors will be primed to imagine a factually exculpatory scenario.
226. William C. Thompson et al., Inadmissible Evidence and Juror Verdicts, 40 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 453,454 (1981).
227. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THROUGH THE EYES OF A JUROR: A MANUAL FOR
ADDRESSING JUROR STRESS 72 (1998), http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications[ResJuries-
JurorStressAppendPub.pdf.
228. See id. at 71.
229. Roese, supra note 220, at 144.
230. Normally, not always. False convictions in circumstantial cases do occasionally result
from unreliable evidence-contamination, lab error, etc. See HUFF ET AL., supra note 91, at 64.
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3. The Certainty Effect
As we've seen, there is a fundamental distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence in terms of probative value. The probative value of
reliable direct evidence is necessarily 1.0 because it proves a fact directly
rather than through inference. A perfect eyewitness identification says, "I
saw the defendant commit the crime." A perfect confession admits, "I
committed the crime." In both cases, the defendant cannot be innocent
unless the jury concludes that the evidence is somehow unreliable.
The probative value of even the most reliable circumstantial evidence,
by contrast, is necessarily less than 1.0, because it is inherently polyvocal-
logically consistent with both innocence and guilt. A DNA match, for ex-
ample, may make guilt overwhelmingly likely; the exculpatory inference(s)
the defendant asks jurors to draw may stretch credulity to the breaking
point. But it can never unconditionally prove the defendant's guilt.
Does this distinction matter? The objective probability of guilt in a cir-
cumstantial case is often well beyond what most jurors believe is the
minimum required by the reasonable-doubt standard---0.82-and is some-
times very near to 1.0. In the Smith study discussed earlier, for example, the
211overall probability of the defendant's guilt was 0.98. Is there any reason to
believe that jurors will be more afraid of a false conviction in a 0.98 circum-
stantial case than in a 1.0 direct case?
As it turns out, there is a reason: "responses to uncertain situations ap-
pear to have an all or none characteristic that is sensitive to the possibility
rather than the probability of strong positive or negative consequences, caus-
ing very small probabilities to carry great weight. 232 In other words, when
individuals make decisions that could turn out to be wrong, they "over-
weight outcomes that are considered certain, relative to outcomes which are
merely probable"-a phenomenon Kahneman and Tversky aptly call the
certainty effect.
233
The certainty effect is even greater when an uncertain decision is ac-
companied by "anticipatory emotions" such as fear, anxiety, and dread.2 3
When individuals confront such an emotionally powerful decision, the need
for certainty intensifies, leading to an even more dramatic overweighting of
the possibility-however insignificant-of a negative outcome.235 Faced
with the frightening prospect of being poisoned by insect spray, for exam-
ple, individuals will pay far more to reduce their risk from
231. Smith et al., supra note 58, at 58.
232. Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect,
Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 318 (2004).
233. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, FRAMES 17, 20 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
234. Loewenstein et al., supra note 128, at 267.
235. Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the
Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 186-87 (2001); see also Slovic et al., supra
note 232, at 318 ("[I]f the potential outcome of a gamble is emotionally powerful, its attractiveness
or unattractiveness is relatively insensitive to changes in probability as great as from 0.99 to 0.01.").
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five-in-ten-thousand to zero than they will to reduce it from fifteen-in-ten-
thousand to five-in-ten-thousand, even though the risk reduction in the latter
case is twice as large.236
The certainty effect indicates that there is, in fact, a fundamental psycho-
logical difference between 1.0 and .98 probabilities of guilt. Reaching a
verdict in a criminal trial is a quintessential example of affect-rich decision-
making, as the juror-stress statistics indicate. Because of the certainty effect,
therefore, jurors will dramatically underweight the "merely probable" cir-
cumstantial case and dramatically overweight the "considered certain"
direct case-making the circumstantial case seem far more likely to result in
a false conviction.
Once again we are confronted with the limitations of the probability-
threshold model. The certainty effect indicates that it is not enough for ju-
rors to believe that the probability of the defendant's guilt exceeds some
minimum threshold; because the possibility of a false conviction is so aver-
sive, they need to be completely confident that the defendant is guilty.237
Direct evidence, with its appearance of certainty, is that convincing; circum-
stantial evidence, with its open admission of the possibility of error, is not.
Daniel Shaviro says it best: "[s]tatistical-probability cases do not involve a
greater risk of verdict error than other types of cases, only a more overt
risk.,
238
4. What About Unreliability?
This explanation of why a direct case normally leads to weaker priming
than a circumstantial case assumes, of course, that the reliability of direct
evidence does not affect whether jurors are afraid of a false conviction. If
jurors question the reliability of direct evidence, they have to discount its
probative value to take their concerns into account. And if that happens, the
possibility of a false conviction will be just as overt as in a circumstantial
case.
As a matter of theory, there is no question that the probative value of di-
rect evidence is never 1.0. "Since the credibility of a witness always rests in
part on circumstantial evidence, the probative value of all evidence always
236. Loewenstein et al., supra note 128, at 276; see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, FRAMES, supra note 233, at 1, 9 ("[Pleople
greatly undervalue a reduction in the probability of a hazard in comparison to the complete elimina-
tion of that hazard.").
237. In fact, one study found that 28% of the individuals surveyed did not believe that even a
99.5% probability of guilt is sufficient to convict. Eric Magnusson, Incomprehension and Miscom-
prehension of Statistical Evidence: An Experimental Study 3 (July 6-8, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, presented at Law, Medicine and Criminal Justice), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/
conferences/medicine/magnus.pdf. That finding is a striking example of the disjunction between
jurors' probabilistic understanding of reasonable doubt, which hovers around 0.82, and the gut-level
certainty that ultimately determines their verdict choice.
238. Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance of Justice, 103
HARV. L. REV. 530, 538 (1989).
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effectively rests on circumstantial evidence."239 Nor is there any question
that, in practice, jurors sometimes question the reliability of eyewitness
identifications and confessions.
Neither fact, however, is fatal to the theory of priming I am advancing
here. First, we are concerned with how jurors actually interpret evidence,
not with its epistemological status. The certainty effect says that jurors
"overweight outcomes that are considered certain,'2 40 not outcomes that are
certain.
Second, as explained in Part I, research indicates that jurors rarely ques-
tion the reliability of direct evidence. Jurors dramatically overestimate the
accuracy of eyewitness identifications, ignore the factors that determine
whether an identification is reliable in favor of one-witness confidence-
that doesn't, and convict in eyewitness cases even in the face of exculpatory
evidence. A similar pattern emerges regarding confessions, which are so
compelling that they "tend to overwhelm other information, including evi-
dence of innocence., 24' And then there are the false-conviction statistics
themselves, which paint an even more disturbing picture of jurors deferring
to eyewitness identifications and confessions with little or no concern for
their reliability.
The question is-why? Jurors can hardly be unaware that individuals
sometimes lie and make mistakes, and only the most incompetent defense
attorney will fail to challenge the honesty or accuracy of an eyewitness or
242the "voluntariness" of a confession. Why, then, are jurors so rarely swayed
by those challenges?
The answer, I believe, is twofold. First, in many situations jurors simply
fail to recognize problems with the reliability of direct evidence. And sec-
ond, jurors often accept direct evidence even when they are aware of
problems with its reliability.
a. The Truth Bias
Jurors are extremely poor at detecting when a witness is lying or mis-
taken. In terms of honesty, "people's ability to distinguish truths from lies
tends to be significantly, but only slightly, better than chance levels. 2 3 In
fact, demeanor evidence244 actually hurts jurors' ability to detect
239. BURNS, supra note 129, at 189.
240. Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 233, at 20.
241. Kassin et al., supra note 52, at 213.
242. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL
TRIALS § 11.35 (2d ed. 1985).
243. See Timothy R. Levine et al., Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the
"Veracity Effect", 66 CoMM. MONOGRAPHS 125, 125 (1999).
244. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID., art. V11I advisory committee's note (noting that the supposed
importance of demeanor evidence underlies the ban on hearsay).
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deception, because they normally rely on the wrong behavioral cues to
246distinguish truth from lies.2 16
Jurors are even worse at detecting inaccuracy. "The studies in which
subjects seek to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses ...
reveal a complete inability to outdo chance, even when using the verbal con-
tent of cross-examined testimony along with demeanor.2 4 That inability is
due, in large part, to the fact that they base their accuracy assessment almost
exclusively on confidence, instead of on factors that actually are related to
witness accuracy, such as testimony's internal consistency.
The basic reason for these failures is that the "most 'fundamental' of all
phenomena in person perception" 249 is the tendency "to accept the autobio-
graphical propositions implicit (or explicit) in others' words and deeds,"
regardless of their veracity. As Norbert Schwarz points out:
[A] large body of psycholinguistic research documents [that] social dis-
course proceeds according to a "cooperative" or "relevance" principle.
This principle holds that speakers should "try to be informative, truthful,
relevant, and clear" and that listeners interpret the speakers' utterances "on
the assumption that they are trying to live up to these ideals."'
It may seem counterintuitive that the truth bias would affect jurors, who
252
expect witnesses to be less than completely objective. In fact, not only
does the bias occur even when receivers "know full well that the assertions
stand an excellent chance of being wrong,' '21 suspicion is actually likely to
backfire, "undermining receivers' ability to detect deceit and, perhaps more
unsettling, also making truth tellers look deceptive."2 4
245. See Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1082 (1991).
246. See, e.g., Levine et al., supra note 243, at 126.
247. See Wellborn, supra note 245, at 1088.
248. Id. at 1088-89.
249. Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Unbelieving the Unbelievable: Some Problems in the Rejection of
False Information, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 601,611 (1990) (citation omitted).
250. Gilbert, supra note 162, at 112; see also Levine et al., supra note 243, at 126 ("Numer-
ous studies have found that independent of actual message veracity, individuals are much more
likely to ascribe truth to other's messages than deceit.") (citation omitted).
251. Norbert Schwarz et al., Base Rates, Representativeness, and the Logic of Conversation:
The Contextual Relevance of "Irrelevant" Information, 9 SOC. COGNITION 67, 68 (1991) (citations
omitted). The truth bias also includes an assumption of accuracy. See William B. Swann, Jr. et al.,
Where Leading Questions Can Lead: The Power of Conjecture in Social Interaction, 42 J. PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1025, 1026 (1982); see also PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS
27 (1989).
252. See, e.g., McKenzie et al., supra note 136, at 15.
253. Gilbert, supra note 162, at 112.
254. Judee K. Burgoon et al., Testing Interpersonal Deception Theory: Effects of Suspicion on
Communication Behaviors and Perceptions, 6 COMM. THEORY 243, 263-64 (1996). Burgoon's
explanation is that receiver suspicion provides dishonest speakers with the feedback they need to be
more convincing, and leads honest speakers to seem defensive or uncomposed-behaviors stereo-
typically associated with dishonesty. Id. at 264.
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b. Responsibility-Laundering
There is also reason to believe that jurors are far less suspicious of wit-
nesses who provide direct testimony than false-conviction statistics indicate
they should be. Given their role as the ultimate finders of fact, jurors have a
clear incentive to believe that direct evidence is true: if the defendant turns
out to be innocent, they can blame the witness instead of themselves, mini-
.- 255
mizing their responsibility for the false conviction.
Consider, for example, a case in which jurors have to decide whether to
convict the defendant on the basis of an eyewitness identification. If the ju-
rors question the eyewitness's honesty but convict anyway, they will have no
one to blame but themselves if the defendant turns out to be innocent. By
contrast, if they do not question the eyewitness's honesty and the defendant
turns out to be innocent, they will be able to reassure themselves that they
didn't falsely convict the defendant, the eyewitness did. They simply be-
lieved he was telling the truth, as he had sworn to do. 56
Trusting direct evidence is, in short, a kind of "responsibility-
laundering"-a way for jurors to manage the fear engendered by the possi-
bility of a false conviction. By putting their faith in eyewitnesses and
confessions, jurors not only convince themselves that the defendant is actu-
ally guilty, they ensure that they have a convenient scapegoat should their
certainty turn out to be misplaced.
c. Narrative Transportation
There is a third reason why jurors rarely recognize the unreliability of
direct evidence: narrative transportation, understood simply as the phe-
nomenological experience of being "temporarily immersed in a story.,
257
When an individual is transported by a narrative, all of her mental sys-
tems-attentive, imagistic, emotive--converge on its events,25s with
dramatic real-world results: her ability to think critically about the narrative
is reduced, making her more likely to believe that it is authentic 259 and less
skeptical of the credibility of its author.2'6 Melanie Green explains why:
[I]ndividuals need both motivation and ability to correct beliefs based on
untrue, inaccurate, or incomplete information. The reduction of negative
255. Cf Sykes & Johnson, supra note 100, at 200.
256. See Wells, supra note 19, at 750 (noting that, in the weigh-attendant case, jurors could
say "I believed him and he was wrong!").
257. Melanie C. Green, Narrative Worlds, Real Impact: How Stories Affect Beliefs 1 (Aug.
21-24, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, presented at IGEL 2002), available at http://www.arts.
ualberta.ca/igelIIGEL2002/Green.pdf.
258. Melanie C. Green & Timothy C. Brock, The Role of Transportation in the Persuasiveness
of Public Narratives, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 701, 701 (2000).
259. Green & Brock, supra note 148, at 334-35.
260. Green & Brock, supra note 258, at 719 ("[O]nce a reader is rolling along with a compel-
ling narrative, the source has diminishing influence .... Thus, narratives might be used to
advantage by low-credible sources or by speakers who lack cogent arguments.").
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cognitive responding resulting from transportation [is thus] due to ability
factors-the person's mental resources are so engaged in experiencing the
story that they are not able to "disbelieve" story conclusions.261
Narrative transportation occurs with both fictional and nonfictional narra-
262tives, and with both readers and listeners.
Because direct evidence normally provides jurors with a vivid and struc-
turally coherent narrative of how the defendant committed the crime, it is a
perfect candidate for transportation. "Although transportation theoretically
could occur with any text, it is far more likely to be experienced in response
to ... well-crafted, high-quality narratives," especially ones with "rich, con-
,,263crete descriptions. Indeed, news stories are replete with references to the
silence that descends on a courtroom as the jurors, judge, and spectators
hang on an eyewitness's every word.264
If direct evidence does lead to narrative transportation, we would expect
jurors to overlook potential problems with its reliability. Questioning narra-
tives like eyewitness identifications and confessions requires significant
cognitive resources, and jurors simply lack those resources during transpor-
tation. As a result, they should be less willing to question the witness's
credibility and more likely to accept the witness's story as true.
d. Belief-Perseverance
Despite the truth bias, responsibility-laundering, and narrative transpor-
tation, there will still be cases in which jurors recognize the potential
unreliability of direct evidence. Will jurors in such cases fear false convic-
tions and thus be primed, as in circumstantial cases, to imagine an FES?
The answer, unfortunately, is probably not. The problem is a cognitive
phenomenon known as belief-perseverance: the tendency of individuals to
"adhere to their beliefs when the original evidential basis of the beliefs is
• ..,,161
shown to be flimsy, false, or nonexistent. Clinging to an eyewitness iden-
tification or confession in light of information discrediting its reliability is a
classic example of belief-perseverance.
In fact, two aspects of direct evidence indicate that such evidence is
likely to lead to belief-perseverance that is particularly strong. First, direct
evidence is normally concrete, and empirical research indicates that belief-
perseverance is stronger "when the initial belief is based on concrete data
than when based on abstract data, even if the concrete data is
261. Green, supra note 257, at 3; see also RICHARD J. GERRIG, EXPERIENCING NARRATIVE
WORLDS: ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTIVITIES OF READING 267-68 (1993).
262. Green & Brock, supra note 258, at 718, 702.
263. Id. at 718-19.
264. See, e.g., Pat Schneider, Rape Survivor Testifies About Attack, CAPITAL TIMES (Madison,
Wi.), Dec. 2, 1992, at 3A ("The silence in the courtroom during her grim, detailed account of the
attack was broken once as a friend of the victim ran sobbing from the courtroom.").
265. Martin E Davies, Belief Persistence After Evidential Discrediting, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 561, 562 (1997).
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logically ... inferior.'2 66 Second, direct evidence is normally causally coher-
ent, because it configures its sequence of events according to the source-
path-goal schema, and a great deal of research indicates that belief-
perseverance is strongest when the discredited evidence is part of a "coher-
ent, causally related account in which a single or minimal correction has a
significant impact on the construal of meaning. 261 Put more simply, when
rejecting an item of evidence as unreliable would require an individual to
discard a narrative of an event that she finds causally convincing, the indi-
vidual will almost always hold onto the narrative and disregard the evidence
instead.
Consider, for example, Jack's confession that he poisoned Jill. His con-
fession is causally coherent; it simply makes sense that Jack would have
forced Jill to take a lethal overdose of Lithium because she was driving him
crazy and he wanted her life insurance. Indeed, in the absence of evidence
pointing to a different scenario, it is difficult to imagine how the confession
could be wrong. So what happens if we later learn that Jack only confessed
because the police beat the confession out of him? Logically, we can no
longer rely on the confession. Psychologically, however, knowing that the
confession was involuntary does not make Jack's confession any less com-
pelling, nor does it help us imagine a scenario in which Jack is innocent. We
thus ignore the inconvenient fact of police brutality and stick with the con-
fession, telling ourselves "just because they beat the confession out of him
doesn't mean he didn't do it.. .."
5. The Reliability of Circumstantial Evidence
The truth bias, responsibility-laundering, narrative transportation, and
belief-perseverance help explain why jurors rarely question the reliability of
direct evidence and thus rarely fear a false conviction in a direct case. Ironi-
cally, they also indicate that jurors are much more likely to recognize the
268
unreliability of circumstantial evidence.
First, the truth bias should have only a minimal effect in circumstantial
cases. The bias leads receivers to ignore evidence that calls into question the
honesty and accuracy of a speaker's autobiographical statements, but the
most important potential problems with forensic evidence-coincidental
matches and unintentional laboratory errors-do not involve dishonesty or
266. Craig A. Anderson, Abstract and Concrete Data in the Perseverance of Social Theories:
When Weak Data Lead to Unshakeable Beliefs, 19 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 95 (1983).
267. Hollyn M. Johnson & Colleen M. Seifert, Sources of the Continued Influence Effect:
When Misinformation in Memory Affects Later Influences, 20 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARN-
ING, MEMORY & COGNITION 1420, 1432 (1994); see also Davies, supra note 265, at 563 ("Once a
causal explanation has been created, it becomes functionally independent of the original evidence so
that if this evidence is discredited, the explanation nevertheless remains intact and available to sus-
tain the belief." (citation omitted)).
268. Empirical research supports this idea. For example, one study involving more than 1500
subjects found "no evidence that jurors will (in any systematic way) ignore the risk of lab error" in a
DNA case-a result that refuted the researchers' initial hypothesis. See Nance & Morris, supra note
55, at 425.
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inaccuracy on the part of the expert witness. Jurors can accept evidence of
such problems, therefore, while continuing to believe that the expert witness
was honest and accurate-in which case the truth bias simply doesn't ap-
ply.
269
Second, responsibility-laundering is not an option for jurors in circum-
stantial cases. Even if jurors trust the witnesses who present circumstantial
evidence in a case, they cannot rationally conclude there is no chance the
defendant is innocent. As a result, if jurors convict a defendant in a circum-
stantial case and the conviction turns out to be false, they have no one to
blame but themselves-they knew the defendant could be innocent,270 but
convicted him anyway.
Third, narrative transportation should not occur with circumstantial evi-
dence, because it is rhetorical instead of narrative. "[T]ransportation is
unlikely in response to even very good rhetoric, whereas ... it can readily
occur in response to a moderately compelling narrative.' 27' Narrative trans-
portation results from the convergence of attention, imagery, and feelings
that a well-crafted story creates in the mind of a reader or listener. An argu-
ment, no matter how well-crafted, simply doesn't generate such
272
convergence.
Fourth, and finally, belief-perseverance should be much less pronounced
in a circumstantial case. As discussed above, belief-perseverance is strongest
when the evidence supporting a belief is concrete and causally coherent.
Circumstantial evidence is neither, whether considered individually or in
terms of an overall FIS.
D. Imagining the Factually Exculpatory Scenario
We can now turn to the second stage of the ease-of-simulation model,
imagining the factually exculpatory scenario. It is not enough for jurors to
be primed to imagine an FES; if it were, convictions in circumstantial cases
would be few and far between. Instead, the question is whether, once they
are primed, jurors can imagine an FES that sufficiently exceeds its minimum
acceptable imaginability to justify an acquittal. This Part explains why ju-
rors are far more likely to succeed in a circumstantial case than in a direct
case.
269. It is possible that the truth bias will reduce jurors' willingness to consider evidence of
what I call "hybrid" circumstantial errors-falsified lab results, intentional laboratory errors, experts
lying about their credentials, and the like-which do depend on the honesty or accuracy of the ex-
pert witness.
270. As indeed they do. See, e.g., Magnusson, supra note 237, at 3 (reporting that 85.4% of
the individuals in his study were aware that a blood test cannot completely prove guilt).
271. Green & Brock, supra note 258, at 719.
272. Seeid. at 718-19.
[Vol. 105:241
The Cognitive Psychology
1. Recognizing Evidence of Innocence
Juror decision-making is an active process in which "[m]eaning is as-
signed to trial evidence through the incorporation of that evidence into one
or more plausible accounts or scenarios describing what happened during
crime-related events testified to during the trial." '273 Evidence, therefore, is
logically prior to narration: before jurors can imagine an FES, they must
first be able to recognize evidence that indicates the defendant could be in-
nocent. In the absence of evidence of innocence, jurors will simply lack the
274
raw material necessary for imagination.
For two reasons, jurors are less likely to recognize evidence of inno-
cence in a direct case than in a circumstantial case: (a) a direct case does not
always contain evidence of innocence, whereas a circumstantial case always
does; and (b) jurors will often ignore evidence of innocence in a direct case,
but will rarely do so in a circumstantial case.
a. Evidence of Innocence
To begin with, there is no guarantee that there will be evidence of inno-
cence in a direct case. Eyewitness identifications and confessions cannot
themselves be evidence of innocence, because their univocity makes them
consistent only with the defendant's guilt. The testimony of a rape victim
identifying the defendant as her assailant, for example, is exclusively incul-
patory; it cannot be re-narrated into an account of how the defendant did not
commit the rape.
This is not to say that jurors have to believe direct evidence. There will
always be cases in which they question its reliability. In the hypothetical
rape case, for example, the victim's own testimony may make it clear that
she did not see her assailant long enough to identify him accurately. But
even that will not turn the identification or confession into evidence of inno-
cence: questioning the defendant's guilt is not the same thing as being able
to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is factually innocent. And the
ease-of-simulation hypothesis indicates that only the latter will lead jurors to
acquit.
To find evidence of innocence in a direct case, then, jurors must look
beyond the eyewitness identification or the confession itself. But where will
they look? The additional evidence must come from either the prosecution
or the defense. The prosecution is rarely a viable option: because eyewitness
identifications and confessions are more than sufficient to convict by
273. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 95, at 253.
274. I am intentionally using "evidence of innocence" instead of "exculpatory evidence." The
latter term refers to any evidence that makes the defendant's guilt less probable; the former refers to
evidence that not only makes the defendant's guilt less probable, but also can be incorporated into a
factually exculpatory scenario. All evidence of innocence, therefore, is exculpatory evidence, but not
all exculpatory evidence is evidence of innocence.
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themselves, they are often the prosecution's only evidence in a direct case."'
The defense is a more likely choice, because it is responsible for convincing
the jurors to acquit.116 And indeed, there are cases in which the defense at-
tempts to rebut an eyewitness identification or confession by providing
jurors with evidence that the defendant could not have committed the
crime.27
Not all defenses, however, attempt to establish the defendant's factual
innocence.2 78 A "pure" reasonable-doubt defense, for example, puts on no
evidence at all, choosing instead to "attack[] the prosecution's case as one
whose narrative 'does not make sense' or 'cannot be trusted' or 'raises sus-
picion, but nothing more.' ,,27 Such defenses are particularly common in
direct cases, because the univocity of eyewitness identifications and confes-
sions often limits the defense to challenging their reliability. But their use
comes with a price: depriving the jury of its most likely source for affirma-
tive evidence of innocence.
In a circumstantial case, by contrast, there is always evidence of inno-
cence, because the polyvocity of circumstantial evidence means that it is
simultaneously evidence of guilt and innocence. As a result, regardless of
whether the defense introduces its own evidence of innocence, the prosecu-
tion provides jurors with evidence they can use to imagine an FES simply by
building its case out of circumstantial evidence.
Consider again the murder case in which the defendant's blood was
found on the murder weapon, a pair of scissors. The bloodstain is certainly
inculpatory; guilt, in fact, is probably the most logical inference a juror
could draw from it. As we saw earlier, however, the evidence is not "incapa-
ble of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his
guilt."28 The bloodstain is thus evidence of innocence as well as evidence of
guilt.
b. The Confirmation Bias
To recognize exculpatory evidence, jurors must be able to distinguish
objectively between evidence that supports innocence and evidence that
supports guilt.2s1 Once jurors conclude that the defendant is most likely
275. See, e.g., SCOTT CHRISTIANSON, INNOCENT: INSIDE WRONGFUL CONVICTION CASES 169
(2004) (discussing the case of Lazaro Burt).
276. Pragmatically, not legally-because the burden of proof is on the prosecution, the de-
fense has no legal responsibilities at all.
277. An alibi or evidence that someone else committed the crime are examples.
278. See Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449, 456
(2001).
279. John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered Representation: What Is a True Believer
to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide?, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 85, 106 (1999).
280. WILLS, supra note 154, at 171.
281. Cf. Kurt A. Carlson & J. Edward Russo, Biased Interpretation of Evidence by Mock
Juries, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 91, 92 (2001) (noting that traditional evidence-
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guilty, however, such objectivity becomes almost impossible to maintain-a
confirmation bias sets in that limits their ability to recognize evidence in-
consistent with that conclusion.22 The extent of the bias, moreover, is
determined by jurors' confidence in their verdict: the greater their confi-
281dence, the more significant the distortion.
The confirmation bias is likely to be devastating to the defense in direct
cases, where jurors' initial confidence in the defendant's guilt is normally
very high. First, jurors may focus exclusively on evidence that confirms
their belief that the defendant is guilty, preventing them from recognizingS284
evidence that is consistent with the defendant's innocence. An example is
the Thrower case in Bedau and Radelet's study, in which jurors accepted a
biased eyewitness identification-by the murdered police officer's partner-
even though three unrelated witnesses testified that the defendant was in a
different state when the crime was committed .
Second, even when jurors recognize exculpatory evidence, they may
simply discount it 86 or subject it to unfairly critical evaluation."' For exam-
ple, jurors may recognize that a confession was coerced, but conclude that
the coercion doesn't mean the defendant didn't commit the crime (discount-
ing). Or jurors may disregard an alibi on the ground that the witness was
biased, even though there is no evidence to that effect in the record (unfairly
critical evaluation).
Third, jurors may accept inculpatory evidence at face value, ignoring
questions about its reliability. This is another form of belief-perseverance,
one that undermines the defense's attempts to impeach a witness through
extrinsic evidence 28 instead of through cross-examination.
Fourth, and finally, jurors may interpret ambiguous evidence in a man-
ner consistent with the defendant's guilt." 9 For example, if alibi evidence
strongly but not definitively suggests that the defendant did not commit the
crime, jurors may give the prosecution the benefit of the doubt and assume
that the defendant could still have committed it.
In a circumstantial case, by contrast, the confirmation bias will be much
weaker. The most obvious reason is that, as we've seen, jurors' initial
updating models "all presume jurors' unbiased interpretation of the new information, followed by a
reweighting of this evidence as it is aggregated to form the juror's decision").
282. See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 222, at 893.
283. Carlson & Russo, supra note 281, at 93.
284. David M. Sanbonmatsu et al., The Subjective Beliefs Underlying Probability Overestima-
tion, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 276, 278 (1997).
285. Bedau & Radelet, supra note 12, at 163.
286. See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 284, at 278; see also Derek J. Koehler, Explanation,
Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL. 499, 511 (1991).
287. See Charles G. Lord et al., Considering the Opposite: A Corrective Strategy for Social
Judgment, 47 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1231, 1232 (1984).
288. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.21 (3d ed.
2003).
289. See Koehler, supra note 286, at 511; see also Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 284, at 278.
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confidence in the defendant's guilt is usually far lower in circumstantial
cases, minimizing the magnitude of the bias.
There is, however, an even more important reason: the strong priming
characteristic of circumstantial cases will counteract the confirmation bias,
making jurors far more likely to recognize evidence of innocence they can
use to imagine an FES. When jurors are confident that the defendant is
guilty, "a certain inertia sets in, which makes it more difficult to consider
alternative hypotheses impartially."'29' That inertia then leads to the various
292effects of the confirmation bias. The most effective way to overcome the
confirmation bias is thus for jurors to try to simulate an alternative hypothe-
sis-a factually exculpatory scenario-without the intention of confirming
the defendant's guilt. Such effort will reduce the inertia created by the FIS,
"altering the framing of the problem in a way that makes the person less
biased in favor of the original hypothesis."2 93
The debiasing effects of a "consider-the-opposite" strategy have been
widely documented. Individuals who consider the opposite pay more atten-
214tion to evidence that contradicts their initial hypothesis, show less belief-
295 296perseverance, and interpret evidence more impartially.
2. Creating an Exculpatory Storyline
If jurors do recognize evidence of innocence, they must then use that
evidence to imagine a factually exculpatory scenario. The latter does not
necessarily follow from the former: recognizing that one or more items of
evidence is consistent with the defendant's innocence does not necessarily
allow the juror to imagine how the defendant might actually be innocent.
Imagining an FES, therefore, initially requires jurors to create a "causal ex-
planation that . .. account[s] for the data present in the decision
problem"'97-the scenario's storyline.
There are three reasons why jurors should normally find it difficult to
create an exculpatory storyline in a direct case. First, the univocity of direct
evidence renders it useless for exculpatory story-creation: if eyewitness
identifications and confessions cannot be incorporated into a narrative ac-
count of the defendant's innocence, they certainly cannot generate the
storyline of such an account. Consider again the rape case mentioned above.
Nothing in the victim's testimony suggests that the defendant had an alibi,
290. See Carlson & Russo, supra note 281, at 93.
291. Koehler, supra note 286, at 503.
292. Seeid. at511.
293. Id. at 512.
294. See id. at 513; Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, 6 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSY-
CHOL.: HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 113 (1980).
295. Lord et al., supra note 287, at 1240.
296. Id. at 1239.
297. Dougherty et al., supra note 123, at 136.
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that someone else was the rapist, that the victim consented, etc. Those ex-
culpatory storylines are all logically possible-but they require evidence
other than the victim's identification for the jury to imagine them. All her
testimony suggests is that the defendant is guilty.
Second, because eyewitness identifications and confessions are normally
only vulnerable to attacks on their reliability, the defense is very likely to
use a pure reasonable-doubt defense in a direct case. By definition, however,
that defense does not help jurors create an exculpatory storyline: knowing
how the crime didn't happen doesn't help them imagine how it did.Y
Third, even when the defense does use a factual-innocence defense,
there is no guarantee that jurors will take its exculpatory storyline seriously.
The confirmation bias not only limits individuals' ability to recognize evi-
dence that challenges their focal hypothesis, it also leads them to truncate
299their search for alternative hypotheses. In a direct case, therefore, where
jurors' initial confidence in the defendant's guilt is normally very high, the
confirmation bias is likely to cause jurors to overlook whatever exculpatory
storyline the defense might offer.
In a circumstantial case, by contrast, jurors should find it much easier to
create an exculpatory storyline. To begin with, the fact that there is necessar-
ily evidence of innocence in a circumstantial case promotes storyline
creation. Because of polyvocity, jurors can always draw exculpatory instead
of inculpatory inferences from the prosecution's circumstantial evidence.
Those exculpatory inferences can then form the basis of an exculpatory
storyline. Recall the murder trial in which the circumstantial evidence con-
sisted of Jill's skin under Jack's fingernails, fresh scratches on Jack's cheek,
Jack's delay in calling 911 and calmness on the phone, and the recently pur-
chased insurance policy on Jill's life. Although the inculpatory inferences
the prosecution asks jurors to draw certainly make sense, exculpatory infer-
ences are possible as well: Jill wanted the life-insurance policy because she
was suicidal; she was twitching violently from the Lithium overdose when
Jack tried to help her; and Jack was still in shock when he called 911.
Taken together, those exculpatory inferences suggest a coherent story-
line for Jack's FES. There is no guarantee, of course, that jurors will draw
the inferences that are necessary to create that story. Nevertheless, because
they do not have to generate the inferences ex nihilo, there is at least a rea-
sonable likelihood that jurors will draw them-especially given that the
strong priming characteristic of circumstantial cases will motivate them to
want to imagine how Jack might be innocent.
In addition, the defense is more likely to provide jurors with an exculpa-
tory storyline in a circumstantial case. The defense only uses a pure
298. 1 am not suggesting that it is impossible for the defense to use a pure reasonable-doubt
argument to suggest an exculpatory storyline. For example, the defense could use questions about
the veracity of an eyewitness to suggest that the eyewitness is, in fact, the real killer. See, e.g., Bedau
& Radelet, supra note 12, at 103 (describing the case of Nathaniel Carter). Still, such defenses are
unlikely to be persuasive in the absence of additional evidence linking the eyewitness to the crime-
in which case the "pure" defense is really a factual-innocence alternative-perpetrator defense.
299. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 286, at 512.
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reasonable-doubt defense in a direct case out of necessity-because the uni-
vocity of eyewitness identifications and confessions limits it to attacking
their reliability. In a circumstantial case, by contrast, the defense rarely faces
such a dire predicament: even if it has no affirmative evidence of the defen-
dant's innocence, it can always take advantage of the polyvocal nature of
circumstantial evidence to suggest an exculpatory storyline to jurors. That
kind of modified reasonable-doubt defense--one that provides an exculpa-
tory storyline and acknowledges that even the strongest circumstantial case
leaves open the possibility of the defendant's innocence-is likely to be ef-
fective, because the absence of a pronounced confirmation bias in
circumstantial cases will normally ensure that jurors pay attention to it.
3. Imagining the Factually Exculpatory Scenario
Once jurors recognize evidence of innocence and use that evidence to
construct an exculpatory storyline, the factually exculpatory scenario is es-
sentially complete. The question then becomes-how easy is that FES to
imagine? Two factors determine the imaginability of the FIS: structural co-
herence and vividness. It is reasonable to assume that the same factors apply
to the FES as well.
If that assumption is correct, the ease of imagining the FES depends
primarily on the kind of evidence used to construct it. When the defense
uses direct evidence, the evidence's narrative structure will lead jurors to
imagine an FES that is both vivid and structurally coherent. When it uses
circumstantial evidence, the rhetorical structure of the evidence will lead
jurors to imagine an FES that is pallid and structurally incoherent.
There is also reason to believe that jurors normally find it more difficult
to imagine a structurally coherent FES in a direct case than in a circumstan-
tial case. A critical factor determining the persuasiveness of a scenario--
inculpatory or exculpatory-is its coverage, "the extent to which the story
accounts for evidence presented at trial."3°° The greater a scenario's cover-
age, the more acceptable jurors find it as an explanation of the evidence.0
Pennington and Hastie never explain why coverage is so important to per-
suasiveness, but other research indicates that lack of coverage undermines a
scenario's causal coherence.' °2 That makes sense: how can a scenario be
plausible if it simply ignores contradictory evidence? In the Lithium case,
for example, no matter how causally coherent Jack's "suicide" scenario may
be on its own terms, it would seem much less causally coherent if it did not
and could not explain why his skin was found under Jill's fingernails.
The prosecution's evidence in a circumstantial case rarely creates a cov-
erage problem for the FES. Because circumstantial evidence is polyvocal,
300. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 130, at 527-28.
301. Id. at 528.
302. See Stephen J. Read & Amy Marcus-Newhall, Explanatory Coherence in Social Expla-
nations: A Parallel Distributed Processing Account, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 429, 432
(1993).
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jurors do not have to discount the prosecution's circumstantial evidence in
order to imagine a causally coherent FES; that evidence can simply be in-
corporated into the FES via its exculpatory inferences. Even if jurors believe
that the skin evidence is reliable, for example, the presence of the skin under
Jill's fingernails is consistent with the idea that the side-effects of her suici-
dal overdose led her to scratch Jack accidentally when he tried to help her.
In a direct case, by contrast, the prosecution's evidence almost always
creates a coverage problem. Because direct evidence is univocal, it cannot
logically be incorporated into an FES. There is no way, for example, to in-
corporate the substance of Jack's confession into an account of how he did
not commit the crime. As a result, any FES the jury considers-that she
committed suicide, for example-will directly contradict Jack's confession;
they cannot both be true. And therein lies the coverage problem: the FES
simply makes no causal sense unless jurors are willing to disregard the con-
fession, something we know they are loath to do. Why would Jack confess
to the crime if she actually killed herself? After all, people don't confess to
crimes they didn't commit."'
4. "Undoing" the Factually Inculpatory Scenario
In terms of recognizing evidence of innocence, creating exculpatory
storylines, and avoiding structural incoherence, then, jurors normally find it
far more difficult to imagine an FES in a direct case than in a circumstantial
case. There is a fourth difficulty as well: research indicates that jurors not
only have to imagine an FES in a direct case, they also have to mentally
"undo" the FIS.3° Before jurors in a direct case can believe the defendant is
innocent, in other words, they have to affirmatively unbelieve that he is
guilty.
What explains this requirement-and why would it not also apply in a
circumstantial case? Once again, the answer depends on the fact that direct
evidence is representational, whereas circumstantial evidence is abstract.
Although both are capable of persuading jurors that the defendant commit-
ted the crime, the kind of belief they engender is different. Two things occur
when jurors hear direct evidence: they construct a mental representation of
the crime that tracks the witness's testimony-an FIS-and they believe,
however preliminarily, that the crime took place the way the witness says it
did. 30 That initial belief does not mean they cannot later reject the directFIS. But it does mean they cannot reject it without first "undoing" the
303. See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An
Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 482
(1997) (noting that because "a confession is a first-hand admission of culpability, a statement pre-
sumably made by someone with intimate knowledge of the event in dispute," jurors "find it difficult
to believe that anyone would confess to a crime he or she did not commit").
304. Sykes & Johnson, supra note 100, at 205.
305. Id. at 209.
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mental representation the witness's description evoked-a process that re-
quires cognitive effort.' 6
Circumstantial evidence, by contrast, is not a narrative account of how
the crime "really happened"; it is simply a probabilistic statement about the
connection between the defendant and an incriminating physical trace of the
crime. When jurors hear circumstantial evidence, therefore, they may imag-
ine an FIS, but they do not have to believe it is true. As Sykes says, "the
comprehension of probabilistic information does not mandate a belief in the
reality of a specific event. ' 307 Rejecting the circumstantial FIS later thus does
not require jurors to undo the mental representation evoked by the evi-
dence-and thus requires no extra cognitive effort at all.308 In short, even
when a direct FIS is no easier to imagine than a circumstantial FIS, it will
still be harder for jurors to imagine an FES in the direct case. "[A] belief
engendered by an assertion about an event is more difficult to mutate than a
belief based solely on statistical probabilities.' 9
This extra cognitive effort may seem insignificant, but it's not. To begin
with, the amount of extra cognitive effort is not static: the easier the direct
FIS is to imagine, the greater the effort required to replace it with an FES.
As Sykes found in her study of the Blue Bus problem, jurors "who found it
easiest to imagine the represented event found it more difficult to 'undo' that
event and imagine its alternative. In the probabilistic condition, by contrast,
ease of imagining the likely event did not hinder imagination of its alterna-
tive. ' ' O
Moreover, because jurors' overall processing capacity is not unlimited,
they normally conserve their cognitive resources."' Jurors are rarely
strongly primed to try to imagine an FES in a direct case, so the extra cogni-
tive effort required to undo the FIS may make the difference between
recognizing evidence of innocence and simply overlooking it.
VI. THE PARADOX OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE REVISITED
At the beginning of this article, I unpacked the "paradox of circumstan-
tial evidence" into two questions. First, why are jurors likely to acquit in a
circumstantial case even when they know that the evidence is sufficient to
convict? And second, why are jurors likely to convict in a direct case even
when there is reason to believe that the evidence may be unreliable?
Having examined the two basic stages of the ease-of-simulation
model-imagining the FIS and the FES-as well as the priming mechanism
that mediates between them, we can now answer those questions. This Part
306. Id. at 202 ("Some effort ... is required to disbelieve a witness-to 'undo' the representa-
tion the witness makes about an event.").
307. Id. at 209.
308. Id. at 210.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Sanbonmatsu et al., supra note 222, at 893.
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begins by applying the model to ideal-typical direct and circumstantial
cases. It then discusses how the principles gleaned from those cases likely
function in "mixed" cases, in which both direct and circumstantial evidence
are present. Finally, it shows how the ease-of-simulation model helps
deepen our understanding of why false acquittals are so common in circum-
stantial cases and false convictions are so common in direct cases.
A. "Ideal-Typical" Direct Cases
The ease-of-simulation model explains why jurors are likely to convict
in a direct case even when there is reason to believe that the evidence may
be unreliable. First, no matter how unreliable the evidence may be, jurors
usually find it easy to imagine an FIS in a direct case. Because direct evi-
dence is a complete narrative representation of the crime, the FIS jurors
imagine is normally both vivid and structurally coherent-the two factors
that determine a scenario's imaginability. In a direct case, therefore, jurors'
initial confidence in the defendant's guilt and the minimum acceptable
imaginability of the FES are both likely to be quite high.
Second, jurors in a direct case are rarely strongly primed to imagine an
FES, because the unconditional nature of direct evidence combines with the
truth-bias, responsibility-laundering, narrative transportation, and belief-
perseverance to effectively eliminate the fear of a false conviction that
would lead to priming.
Third, jurors normally find it difficult to imagine an FES in a direct case.
Not only does the univocity of direct evidence render the prosecution's evi-
dence useless for an FES, but the lack of priming means that the
confirmation bias limits jurors' ability to recognize evidence of innocence or
exculpatory storylines provided by the defense-assuming the defense pro-
vides them at all.
A direct case, in short, often leads to an easily imagined FIS, a high
minimum acceptable imaginability for the FES, and an FES whose ease of
imagination does not exceed its acceptable minimum. As a result, even if
jurors' initial confidence in the defendant's guilt is not sufficient for them to
convict, the FES is likely to backfire and increase their initial confidence-
increasing the likelihood that they will convict, as well.
B. "Ideal-Typical" Circumstantial Cases
The ease-of-simulation model also explains why jurors are likely to ac-
quit in a circumstantial case even when they know that the evidence is
sufficient to convict. First, regardless of the objective probability of the de-
fendant's guilt, jurors usually find it difficult to imagine an FIS in a
circumstantial case. The rhetorical nature of circumstantial evidence-the
fact that it is evidence of a crime, not a representation of it-not only makes
a structurally coherent FIS difficult to imagine, it also normally ensures that
any FIS jurors do imagine (with or without the prosecution's help) lacks
vividness. In a circumstantial case, therefore, jurors' initial confidence in the
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defendant's guilt and the minimum acceptable imaginability of the FES are
both likely to be quite low.
Second, jurors in a circumstantial case are almost always primed to
imagine an FES, because the probabilistic nature of circumstantial evidence
necessarily leaves open the possibility that the defendant is innocent, lead-
ing jurors-as a result of the certainty effect-to fear a false conviction.
Third, jurors generally find it relatively easy to imagine an FES in a cir-
cumstantial case. The polyvocity of circumstantial evidence means that the
prosecution's own evidence is available for use in an FES, and strong prim-
ing normally ensures that jurors will pay close attention to any evidence of
innocence or exculpatory storylines that the defense offers.
Relative to a direct case, then, a circumstantial case often leads to an FIS
that is difficult to imagine, a lower minimum acceptable imaginability for
the FES, and an FES whose ease of imagination exceeds its acceptable
minimum. As a result, not only is jurors' initial confidence in the defen-
dant's guilt normally quite low, the FES they imagine often reduces their
initial confidence even further, increasing the likelihood that they will ac-
quit.
C. "Mixed" Cases
Though ideal-typical cases are certainly not rare, cases in which the
prosecution uses both direct and circumstantial evidence to prove the defen-
dant's guilt are more common.'12 How do the principles we have identified
in the context of ideal cases apply to such "mixed" cases?
A general answer to that question is impossible; all criminal cases are
different. If we think of the ideal cases as the opposite ends of a spectrum,
however, we can move along the spectrum and examine five kinds of mixed
cases that are most likely to occur.
First, closest to the "ideal direct" end, there are cases in which the
prosecution uses circumstantial evidence to reinforce direct evidence that,
by itself, would be sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt-a rape case, for
example, in which a DNA match supports the victim's identification of the
defendant as her attacker. This kind of case is functionally equivalent to an
ideal direct case: the fact that the account is a complete narrative representa-
tion of the crime makes the FIS easy to imagine, prevents strong priming,
and inhibits imagining an FES. Moreover, even though the presence of the
DNA potentially opens up exculpatory inferences-perhaps the sex was
consensual?-the confirmation bias means that jurors will likely ignore or
discount them.
Second, there are cases in which only direct evidence is present, but that
evidence does not create a complete narrative representation of the crime.
An example would be the Maimonides scenario, in which a witness saw
everything but the actual murder itself. Here, the probative value of the
prosecution's evidence is necessarily less than 1.0, creating the possibility
312. See JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 40 (1935).
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that jurors will be strongly primed to imagine an FES. Strong priming,
though, is still unlikely: although jurors are extremely sensitive to deviations
away from certainty, research indicates they are generally willing to convict
on the basis of probabilistic evidence that-like this scenario---establishes a
0.995 likelihood of the defendant's guilt."' And if jurors are not strongly
primed, they are almost certain to convict, because the univocity of the
prosecution's direct evidence will prevent it from being used in an FES and
the confirmation bias will ensure that jurors ignore or discount any FES the
defense offers.
Third, there are cases involving more significant gaps in direct evi-
dence-a murder case, for example, in which a witness saw the defendant
and victim arguing at the scene of the crime near the time of the murder, but
did not see the defendant actually commit the crime. In this kind of case, the
FIS is more difficult to imagine because of the gaps in the eyewitness's nar-
rative and strong priming is more likely because the probative value of the
direct evidence, though sufficient to convict, is substantially less than 0.995.
In the absence of strong priming, an acquittal is still unlikely: even though
the minimum acceptable imaginability of the FES will be lower, univocity
and the confirmation bias will still make it difficult for jurors to imagine an
FES.
If jurors are strongly primed, however, conviction becomes much less
certain. Here the determining factor should be whether the defense provides
jurors with an imaginable FES: although the direct evidence will not itself
suggest an exculpatory storyline to jurors, the fact that the evidence func-
tions circumstantially makes it structurally compatible with an exculpatory
scenario. An alibi defense, for example, will be causally coherent and easy
to imagine as long as it does not contradict the eyewitness's testimony about
the fight.
Fourth, there are cases in which the prosecution constructs its FIS out of
roughly equal proportions of direct and circumstantial evidence, using the
latter to fill in the gaps in the former-a cocaine possession case, for exam-
ple, in which eyewitnesses testify that the defendant normally sells drugs in
front of a particular house, but the only evidence placing the defendant in-
side the house is a set of fingerprints found on a sofa. This kind of case is
even more likely to lead to an acquittal: not only is the direct evidence con-
sistent with a scenario in which the defendant buys his cocaine in the house
but does not live there, the fact that his fingerprints were found only on the
sofa actually suggests that scenario-the polyvocity of circumstantial evi-
dence in action.
Finally, closest to the "ideal circumstantial" end of the spectrum, there
are cases in which the prosecution's evidence is almost completely circum-
stantial-an arson-for-insurance case, for example, in which there was no
sign of forced entry, the police found flammable chemicals in the owner's
313. Edward F. Wright et al., Factors Affecting the Use of Naked Statistical Evidence of Li-
ability, 136 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 677, 685 (1996). Note, though, that Magnusson's research indicates a
percentage of jurors will not convict even then!
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house, financial records indicate that the business was nearly bankrupt, and
an eyewitness saw the owner near his business not long before the fire
erupted. This kind of case is the functional equivalent of an ideal circum-
stantial case, in which the rhetorical nature of the evidence leads to a
difficult to imagine FIS, strong priming, and an easy to imagine FES. The
only difference is that any FES the defense offers or jurors try to imagine
will have to explain why the defendant was near his business before the fire,
because the truth bias means that jurors will likely assume the eyewitness's
testimony is reliable.
D. False Verdicts
In addition to unraveling the paradox of circumstantial evidence, the
ease-of-simulation model also helps explain why false verdicts are so com-
mon. Traditional models of jury decision-making have to explain false
convictions and false acquittals as distortions in subjective probability, with
jurors either overestimating or underestimating the objective likelihood of
the defendant's guilt.31 4 Such errors clearly take place, but there is no ques-
tion that false verdicts also occur in cases where the possibility of a
substantial deviation between objective and subjective probability is ex-
tremely unlikely. Not all forensic evidence is difficult to understand, for
example, yet the Wells Effect shows that such evidence is still likely to lead
to false acquittals.
To begin with, distinguishing between subjective probability and gut-
level certainty via the ease-of-simulation model helps explain false acquit-
tals. Because there is no necessary relationship between the subjective
probability of an FIS and its ease of imagination, there are likely many
cases-normally involving circumstantial evidence-in which jurors find it
difficult to imagine an FIS that they recognize is objectively sufficient to
convict. Whenever one of those cases also involves an easily imagined FES,
however improbable, a false acquittal will likely result.
Gut-level certainty also helps explain false convictions. Two different
possibilities exist, each of which normally involves direct evidence. First,
there are cases in which the objective and subjective probability of the de-
fendant's guilt require acquittal, but the FIS is so easy to imagine that jurors'
initial confidence is sufficient to convict. In such cases, a false conviction
will result unless the FES exceeds its minimum acceptable imaginability to
such a degree that jurors' final confidence falls below the level of confidence
they believe necessary to convict-unlikely with direct evidence.
Second, and even more troubling, are cases in which the objective and
subjective probability of the defendant's guilt require acquittal and an FIS is
not so easily imagined that jurors' initial confidence is high enough to con-
vict. An acquittal should be afait accompli in that kind of case, but the ease-
of-simulation model indicates that it's not: although the weak FIS will es-
tablish a low minimum acceptable imaginability for the FES, the FES may
314. See, e.g., Davis & Follette, supra note 98, at 678.
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still turn out to be so difficult to imagine that it backfires, increasing jurors'
initial confidence in the defendant's guilt. If the backfire is sufficient to ele-
vate jurors' final confidence above the level of confidence they believe
necessary to convict, a false conviction will still result.
VII. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Research indicates that the possibility of reaching an incorrect verdict
causes jurors considerable stress."' And why not? Although they alone are
responsible for deciding the defendant's fate, they are expected to make that
decision solely on the basis of evidence that has been vetted by the judge
and presented by attorneys they know-or at least suspect-are more con-
cerned with winning than with discovering the truth.
As important as this predicament is, research into jury decision-making
rarely takes it seriously. Probability-centered models like Bayesian analysis
banish emotion entirely, reducing the decision to convict to the same kind of
calculus one might use to buy a new car. And even narrative-based models
like the Story Model still ultimately reduce the decision to convict to the
mechanical application of legal concepts-verdict categories, procedural
instructions, and the burden of proof.' 
6
If this Article has shown anything, though, it is that jurors are far more
interested in the defendant's factual guilt than his legal guilt. The Wells Ef-
fect can only be explained through the concept of gut-level certainty, and the
concept of gut-level certainty is simply irreconcilable with formal models of
jury decision-making. It is clearly not enough for jurors to believe that it is
extremely likely the defendant committed the crime; they need to feel confi-
dent in their gut that the defendant actually committed it. If that feeling is
absent, jurors won't convict no matter how objectively likely they believe
the defendant's guilt to be.
That insight has enormous consequences, the most important of which is
that jurors' need for certainty leads to the paradox of circumstantial evi-
dence and an unacceptable number of false verdicts. Because gut-level
certainty is a function of ease of imagination, not mechanical probability
calculations, there is no necessary or predictable relationship between gut-
level certainty and the objective or subjective probability of the defendant's
guilt. And as we've seen, it is all too easy for guilty defendants to appear
innocent in circumstantial cases and innocent defendants to appear guilty in
direct cases.
But is psychology destiny? Do we simply have to accept that jurors will
decide whether to acquit by trying to imagine a scenario in which the defen-
dant is factually innocent? Or is there some way to eliminate the simulation
heuristic-and the paradox of circumstantial evidence along with it?
315. See NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 227, at 72.
316. For example, Pennington and Hastie simply assume, without empirical evidence, that
jurors will reject their preferred story if it isn't strong enough to prove the defendant's guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 130, at 531 n.24.
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Preventing jurors from using the simulation heuristic is probably too
ambitious of a goal. Judgmental heuristics are normally unconscious, auto-
matic processes,3 7 and there is no reason to believe that the simulation
heuristic is any different. It may be possible, however, to limit the heuristic's
effects, both in terms of the overvaluation of direct evidence and the under-
valuation of circumstantial evidence.
Consider, for example, the absence of strong priming in direct cases-
one of the principal reasons jurors overvalue direct evidence. It may well be
possible to approximate the debiasing effects of strong priming by specifi-
cally instructing jurors to try to imagine a scenario in which the defendant is
factually innocent. Anderson and Lindsay have found that inducing an indi-
vidual to engage in a "counter-explanation" process in which she "imagines
and explains how a different relation is (or might be) true" reduces both be-
lief-perseverance and the confirmation bias."' Similarly, Hirt and Markman
have found that asking individuals to explain an alternative outcome, "even
an alternative version of the same outcome," completely eliminates "the ef-
fects of the prior explanation task on likelihood judgments.'" 9
The most important problem with direct evidence, of course, is that its
narrative structure makes it too easy to imagine an FIS and too difficult to
imagine an FES. Conversely, the basic problem with circumstantial evidence
is that its rhetorical structure makes it too difficult to imagine an FIS and too
easy to imagine an FES. Those problems are likely to prove intractable, be-
cause the relative imaginability of direct and circumstantial evidence seems
to reflect their fundamental epistemological differences. We obviously can-
not order jurors to stop imagining direct evidence and start imagining
circumstantial evidence.
It may be possible, however, to short-circuit the relationship between
ease of imagination and jurors' verdict choices. Researchers have found, for
example, that although jurors sometimes decide whether the defendant
committed a particular crime simply by comparing the facts of the case to
their preexisting prototypes of what that kind of crime "looks like, 320 a well-
crafted jury instruction that "inform[s] jurors that their preferred decision
strategy is inappropriate" and "explain[s] the proper strategy" can almost
completely eliminate that effect."' A similar instruction might prevent jurors
from deciding whether to convict solely on the basis of the simulation heu-
ristic. In terms of circumstantial evidence, for example, the judge could tell
jurors that the ability to imagine an FES is not the same as reasonable doubt,
317. See NISBETT & Ross, supra note 198, at 18.
318. Craig A. Anderson & James J. Lindsay, The Development, Perseverance, and Change of
Nai've Theories, 16 Soc. COGNITION 8, 24 (1998).
319. Hirt & Markman, supra note 217, at 1083-84 (emphasis added).
320. See, e.g., Vicki L. Smith, Prototypes in the Courtroom: Lay Representations of Legal
Concepts, 61 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 857, 865 (1991); see also Norman J. Finkel & Jen-
nifer L. Groscup, Crime Prototypes, Objective Versus Subjective Culpability, and a Commonsense
Balance, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209, 212 (1997).
321. Smith, supra note 320, at 869.
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and then explain in detail how they should use the evidence presented at trial
to determine the objective probability of the defendant's guilt. By itself, in-
struction in Bayesian analysis does not counteract jurors' undervaluation of
circumstantial evidence.322 But that might be due to the fact that, in the ab-
sence of instruction to the contrary, jurors determine guilt solely through the
simulation heuristic. The combination of the two may work.
Similarly, on the direct evidence side, the judge could combine Bayesian
instruction with an explanation of how an easily imagined FIS does not nec-
essarily prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Indeed, the
judge could specifically address the fact that the narrative structure of direct
evidence tends to make even weak or unreliable eyewitness identifications
or confessions easy to imagine.
In both cases, the judge's goal would be "concept revision, not merely
13
concept formation"-the key to successful debiasing. There is no guaran-
tee, of course, that such instructions would minimize the number of false
convictions and false acquittals caused by the paradox of circumstantial evi-
dence. Given the alternative, though, it certainly seems worth a try.
322. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 58, at 78.
323. Smith, supra note 320, at 869.
November 20061
306 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:241
